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A. Seeking Egg Donor: 5’5’’ or Taller, Athletic, SAT 1400+ . . . 
The story is, unfortunately, nothing new. A woman and a man 
long to bring a child into the world, but they are unable to do so be-
cause the woman is infertile.1 So they turn to the scientific stork— 
the field of assisted reproductive technology (ART)2—to deliver their 
baby. Some infertile couples choose surrogacy;3 others choose in vi-
tro fertilization (IVF).4 It all depends on the particular roadblock to 
 
 ∗ Visiting Lecturer, Yale College. University of California, Berkeley, B.A. 1994; Yale 
University School of Medicine, M.D. 2001; Yale Law School, J.D. 2001. Two years ago, while 
sitting in American Legal History and, as always, taking copious notes, I came across the 
$50,000 advertisement for egg donors in the Yale Daily. Needless to say, it sparked my interest 
and led to this article. I would like to thank Professor Robert A. Burt, Honorable Guido 
Calabresi, Dean Ruth Katz, and Professor Eugene Volokh for their generous and thoughtful 
comments. Lastly, this article, and many other things in my life, would not have been possible 
without the continued love and support of my family and Julie, my bride-to-be. 
 1. Infertility affects over 6 million Americans, representing approximately 10% of the 
reproductive age population. American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Fact Sheet: In Vitro 
Fertilization (visited May 15, 2000) <http://www.asrm.org/Patients/FactSheets/invi-
tro.html>. 
 2. Assisted reproductive technologies, or ARTs, are treatments or procedures that in-
volve physical or pharmacological augmentation of the procreative process. They involve con-
trolled ovarian hyperstimulation, artificial insemination (AI), in vitro fertilization (IVF), gam-
ete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), and other emerging 
techniques, including the reimplantation of ovaries to postmenopausal women. See generally 
REPRODUCTIVE ENDOCRINOLOGY, SURGERY, AND TECHNOLOGY (Eli Y. Adashi et al. eds., 
1996) [hereinafter REPRODUCTIVE ENDOCRINOLOGY]. 
 3. Surrogacy is an arrangement where a woman is artificially inseminated and then car-
ries a fetus to term with the expectation of relinquishing parental rights to the biological father 
and his wife following the birth of the child. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1008 (1991). See 
also Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (1988) (finding illegal a surrogacy contract where a 
woman accepted financial remuneration in exchange for a binding relinquishment of her pa-
rental rights to the resultant child). 
 4. In vitro fertilization is “an assisted reproductive technique wherein oocytes are re-
trieved from the ovaries and fertilized extracorporeally with subsequent embryo replacement.” 
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coital conception. This couple chooses egg donation, which has ex-
isted as a form of ART for over a decade. It will allow the couple to 
share genetic ties with their child (through the father), as well as ges-
tational ties (through the mother). Again, nothing new. The differ-
ence is in the details. 
 In this country, women who volunteer to “donate”5 their 
eggs, or oocytes,6 have traditionally been compensated only for their 
inconvenience, not for the oocytes themselves. Financially, this has 
translated into payments ranging from $1,000–$5,000 per donation. 
But this particular couple offers $50,000 to donors—if they meet 
certain criteria.7 
The couple desires a child that reflects their union as much as 
possible, even if the mother is incapable of directly contributing to 
the genetic building blocks. Therefore, they look for a donor who 
resembles the woman—physically, athletically, and intellectually. 
They are willing to pay for their specificity. The concept seems sim-
ple enough: find a donor with the desired characteristics, and, hope-
fully, the offspring will share those characteristics. Whether it really is 
this simple is doubtful, but the couple is hopeful, and grateful. So 
grateful, in fact, that they want to match the donor’s generosity with 
copious financial remuneration. 
The couple targets their advertisement towards college women in 
a set of prestigious universities,8 capitalizing on the financial con-
 
Owen K. Davis, In Vitro Fertilization, in 2 REPRODUCTIVE ENDOCRINOLOGY, supra note 2, 
at 2321. 
 5. I qualify this word with quotes to draw attention to its absurdity. Traditionally, the 
word “donation” refers to the altruistic act of voluntarily giving a good or service without re-
questing or receiving any valuable consideration in return. Here, by contrast, the assisted re-
production profession, and society at large, has misapplied that term to a situation in which the 
“donor” expects and receives valuable consideration. It is a misnomer but one that has become 
entrenched in popular diction and one that I will adopt throughout this article. It is interesting 
to consider why we have latched on to the language of donation here, when it is clearly inap-
plicable. Are we trying to deceive ourselves in order to lessen our moral conflicts with the fact 
that we, as a society, approve of the commodification of human life? 
 6. “Oocyte” is the scientific term for what is commonly known as an “egg.” Oocytes 
are the female contribution to the reproductive process, the male counterpart being sperm. 
Oocytes develop and are released from the ovaries during the cyclical process of ovulation. See 
generally Paul M. Wassarman, Oogenesis, in 1 REPRODUCTIVE ENDOCRINOLOGY, supra note 
2, at 341–55. 
 7. According to the advertisement, women would be considered only if they were 5’5” 
or taller, athletic, intelligent (scored 1400 or higher on the SAT), and did not have significant 
family medical histories. YALE DAILY, Oct. 1, 1999, at 5. 
 8. The advertisement ran in student newspapers at Yale, Harvard, Princeton, MIT, Co-
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straints of education and college life. The response is overwhelming. 
Over 300 tall, intelligent, athletic college women inquire further. 
Some withdraw their applications; some maintain their interest. The 
list is narrowed, and the finalists undergo comprehensive examina-
tions. Doctors perform medical histories, physical and psychological 
exams, and genetic analyses. Finally, one woman is chosen.9 And all 
of this amid a media circus. 
B. E-donors 
Later that same year, egg donation found its way back into the 
media spotlight. In October 1999, a Web site began advertising an 
online egg and sperm auction, with fashion models filling the roles 
of donors. The Web site, www.ronsangels.com, was the brainchild of 
Ron Harris, a Playboy photographer, erotic Web site owner, and 
self-proclaimed expert on society and beauty. The idea for the auc-
tion came to Harris after he read an article about the couple de-
scribed above. It struck the business-savvy Harris that, as a model 
photographer, he was in the perfect position to play procreative 
matchmaker. In a society obsessed with appearance and perfection, 
couples were seeking gamete donors who possessed socially desirable 
characteristics, particularly physical beauty. Struggling models were 
eager to make extra money to support their fledgling careers.10 It was 
a match made in heaven. 
For just $24.95, prospective buyers—fertile or infertile, single or 
married—could browse the site and view pictures and personal biog-
raphies of the various donors. And, at no extra charge, members 
could bid on the gametes in $1,000 increments, with the starting bid 
around $30,000. Couples would have their children, models would 
get their money, and the world would be a prettier place.11 
 
lumbia, Stanford, the University of Pennsylvania, and the California Institute of Technology. 
Irene Sege, A $50,000 Dilemma on Campus: Top Students Wrestle with Egg Donor Lure, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1999, at A1. 
 9. Due to privacy considerations, little data is available on the identity of the chosen 
donor or the outcome of the procedure. 
 10. According to the donor profiles, financial compensation was one of several motiva-
tions for donating gametes. In addition, some cited the altruistic desire to help infertile couples 
have the child of their dreams, and some admitted to the more narcissistic desire to propagate 
their “beautiful” genes without the responsibility of rearing the child. See <http://www.ron-
sangels.com>. 
 11. Mr. Harris had a financial stake in the venture as well. In addition to the $24.95 
membership fee, Mr. Harris would receive a commission, or finder’s fee, amounting to 20% of 
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C. Struck a Nerve 
Oocyte donation is old news. Society has long viewed assisted 
reproduction as an acceptable and valued form of procreation.12 But 
something about the two events recounted above struck a societal 
nerve, rekindling old debates and generating novel ones regarding 
the morality and appropriateness of certain aspects of noncoital re-
production. What made these two events so inflammatory, so capti-
vating, was their blatant commodification of human tissue and po-
tential life. 
Both the advertisement and the Web site immediately stirred 
tremendous public interest and discussion. There was extensive me-
dia coverage—countless articles in newspapers from the New York 
Times to the Yale Daily,13 feature articles in periodicals like News-
week,14 television spotlights on Face The Nation and the Today 
Show,15 and numerous political cartoons depicting the realities and 
 
any eventual gamete donation contract price. Id. 
 12. On July 25, 1978, British fertility specialists announced the birth of Louise Brown, 
the product of the first successful human pregnancy through the use of IVF. See Kenneth J. 
Ryan, Ethical and Legal Implications, in 2 REPRODUCTIVE ENDOCRINOLOGY, supra note 2, at 
1941–42. In 1981, the American Fertility Society (since renamed the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine) announced that IVF should no longer be considered an experimental 
procedure. Id. at 1942–43. By 1990, over 12,000 successful IVF deliveries had been recorded. 
Id. at 1943. More directly, scientists have investigated oocyte donation for over 100 years, re-
sulting in successful human pregnancies since 1983. Zev Rosenwaks & Mark A. Damario, Con-
temporary Treatment Strategies: Egg Donation, in 2 REPRODUCTIVE ENDOCRINOLOGY, supra 
note 2, at 1429–30. 
 13. See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Physical Beauty Is Only Egg Deep, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 
1999, at B15; Bruce Horovitz, Selling Beautiful Babies, USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 1999, at 1A; 
Gina Kolata, $50,000 Offered to Tall, Smart Egg Donor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1999, at A10; 
Sydney Leavens, Yale U. Students and Professors React to Egg Donation Ad, YALE DAILY NEWS, 
Mar. 4, 1999, at 1; Photographer Puts Up Models’ Genes For Sale, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1999, 
at A16; Irene Sege, A $50,000 Dilemma on Campus: Top Students Wrestle With Egg Donor 
Lure, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1999, at A1; Barbara Vobejda, Egg Donation: A Growing Busi-
ness: Fertility Successes Raise Demand, Price, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1999, at A1. 
 14. See, e.g., Claudia Kalb, Baby Boom: The $50,000 Egg, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 15, 1999, at 
64; Tara Weingarten & Mark Hosenball, A Fertile Scheme, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1999, at 78. 
 15. See, e.g., 48 Hours: The Baby Makers; Choosing What Kind of Baby to Have (CBS tele-
vision broadcast, Dec. 30, 1999); CBS This Morning: Egg Donor Sharise and Dr. Arthur 
Caplan Discuss the Issue of Charging for Human Egg Donations (CBS television broadcast, 
Mar. 4, 1999); CNN Morning News: Internet Auctioning of Human Eggs May Become Big 
Business (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 26, 1999); Face the Nation: Professor Susan Wolf, 
University of Minnesota, Discusses the Ethics of Asking for Specific Types of People to Donate Eggs 
to Infertile Couples (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 7, 1999); Today: Infertile Couple Searching 
for Egg Donor Places Half-Page Notice in Ivy League Newspapers (NBC television broadcast, 
Mar. 3, 1999). 
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perversities of a market-driven system of gamete donation. As ex-
pected, the public and experts voiced ethical and moral outrage.16 
But then, as usual, the novelty of these new versions of the same 
old story, new applications of old technologies, began to wear off 
and lose its grip on the religious, philosophical, economic, and ethi-
cal consciousness of the country.17 A little bit ironic, isn’t it? As soon 
as it stops selling papers and airtime, the commodification of human 
existence becomes yesterday’s news—uninteresting and tired. If the 
issue cannot be commodified, who cares if the subject is? So the 
voices faded, and the debate ebbed. 
But troubling issues of individual rights and societal morals re-
main. Should individuals have the right to contract freely for the sale 
of human oocytes, or are there sufficient arguments to support a 
blanket prohibition on the commodification of human gametes? If 
commodification is allowed, should society sanction it through legal 
enforcement of donation agreements, or should such contracts be 
unenforceable—void as against public policy? Should individuals 
such as Ron Harris be in the business of gamete brokerage, or 
should the transactions be limited only to the contracting parties? 
Should we protect participants through safety regulations and infor-
mation dissemination, or should it remain a truly private enterprise? 
 
 16. For example, Dr. Arthur Caplan, a bioethicist at the University of Pennsylvania, 
stated, “We don’t allow a woman to go and sell her baby to some couple who is infertile, but if 
you’re buying all the ingredients—the egg, the sperm and maybe even a surrogate mother—
then I think you’re basically doing the same thing, and I think buying babies is a bad idea.” 
CBS This Morning: Egg Donor Sharise and Dr. Arthur Caplan Discuss the Issue of Charging for 
Human Egg Donations (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 4, 1999). Dr. Glenn McGee, also a 
bioethicist at the University of Pennsylvania, said, “Well, $50,000 for a human egg, in repro-
ductive medicine, is about a 9.9 on my ethics creepometer.” Saturday Morning: Ethics of Speci-
fying Superior Qualities and Paying Extremely Large Sums for Egg Donors (CBS television 
broadcast, Mar. 6, 1999). Dr. Zev Rosenwaks, director of the Center for Reproductive Medi-
cine and Fertility at Cornell University, said of the $50,000 advertisement, “I think it’s a coer-
cive amount of money . . . . This is something that should not be done.” David Lefer, An Ad 
for Smart Eggs Spawns Ethics Uproar, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 7, 1999, at 38. Commenting on 
Ron Harris’ website, Sean Tipton, spokesman for the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine, stated, “It’s unethical and it’s distasteful.” Photographer Puts Up Models’ Genes For 
Sale, supra note 13, at A16. 
 17. Describing this typical plot line for tales of modern baby-making, columnist Sheryl 
Gay Stolberg has stated, “The drama typically unfolds as follows: Whiz-bang scientists develop 
new technique (in vitro fertilization, donated eggs, frozen eggs, frozen ovaries) that makes it 
possible for childless woman (subtext: old childless woman) to conceive. Media circus ensues. 
Ethicists ponder potential abuse. Media circus subsides. Family life goes on.” Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Buying Years for Women on the Biological Clock, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, § 4 
(Week in Review), at 1. 
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The remainder of this article focuses primarily on the first of 
these questions: Should we, as a society, continue to tolerate the 
commodification of human oocytes that currently exists, or should 
we strictly regulate or entirely prohibit the compensation paid to oo-
cyte donors? Part II provides a brief overview of oocyte donation, in-
cluding the procedures involved, its genetic underpinnings, and the 
current regulatory state both in this country and in England, Israel, 
and Australia. Part III addresses the prominent arguments offered 
against the sale of organs and tissues in general, as well as their rele-
vance to oocyte donation. Part IV looks at arguments on both sides 
of the debate specific to assisted reproduction and oocyte donation. 
Part V brings the discussion to an end with the conclusion that al-
though there exist thoughtful reasons to regulate oocyte donor 
compensation, they are outweighed by the arguments for free aliena-
bility. The legitimate rationales for the prohibition of the commodi-
fication of organs are not applicable to oocyte donation, and oocyte-
specific arguments fall short of justifying paternalistic regulation. Ar-
guments in favor of treating such arrangements as enforceable con-
tracts are then presented. Finally, a call is made for other forms of 
regulation within the gamete donation industry, and broader social 
implications of the regulatory debate are highlighted. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. What Is Oocyte Donation, and Why Is It Necessary? 
Oocyte donation—like sperm donation, embryo donation, in vi-
tro fertilization, artificial insemination, and surrogacy—is a form of 
noncoital, or assisted, reproduction. All are procreative methods that 
sidestep, for whatever reason,18 the traditional form of sexual repro-
duction, in which male and female gametes are united inside the fe 
male reproductive tract through the act of sexual intercourse.19 All, 
 
 18. Some people turn to assisted reproduction due to infertility, which can have many 
differing etiologies, such as low sperm count, impaired sperm motility, ovarian failure, or anat-
omic blockage of the female reproductive tract. Others, while fertile, may be physically incapa-
ble of gestating (carrying a pregnancy to term). Some wish to procreate without passing on 
genetic diseases they harbor to their offspring. In addition, individuals and same sex couples 
often turn to assisted reproduction to overcome obvious roadblocks. 
 19. Unless the gamete donor actually has intercourse with the fertile member of the 
couple. Although that method is arguably the most ancient recorded form of assisted repro-
duction, as chronicled in the tales of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar, this is rarely the case nowa-
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therefore, effectively separate the natural linkage between intercourse 
and reproduction, thereby leading to the foundation of much of the 
religious objection to such procedures.20 
The first question that society must answer is why we have as-
sisted reproduction at all. Why shouldn’t individuals who desire chil-
dren but are unable to reproduce sexually turn to adoption instead? 
Unfortunately, an adequate treatment of this question is beyond the 
scope of this article, and the interested reader is directed to writings 
devoted to this topic.21 In short, the strongest rationales for the exis-
tence of assisted reproductive technologies are the implications of 
procreative liberty and the social desirability of preserving the unique 
nature of the genetic and gestational bonds between parents and 
children. 
The concept of procreative liberty, as championed by John 
Robertson, maintains that all individuals should have the right to de-
cide whether or not to exploit their reproductive capacity and that, 
absent strong justification for limiting this right, such as clearly iden-
tifiable and tangible harms, they should have at their disposal all pos-
sible means of effectuating that choice.22 This is so because the deci-
sion whether or not to procreate is so fundamental, so personal, that 
its denial would be antithetical to the pursuit of life, liberty, and 
happiness.23 Robertson and most others conceive of this right to 
procreative liberty as a negative right only—the right to be free from 
 
days. Genesis 16:1–4 (King James). 
 20. Because the Roman Catholic Church views intercourse and reproduction as morally 
inextricably intertwined, it has concluded that assisted reproduction (the inclusion of a third 
party into procreation) is morally corrupt and unacceptable. The current Vatican position 
states, “These procedures are contrary to the human dignity proper to the embryo, and at the 
same time they are contrary to the right of every person to be conceived and to be born within 
marriage and from marriage. Also, attempts or hypotheses for obtaining a human being with-
out any connection with sexuality through ‘twin fission,’ cloning or parthenogenesis are to be 
considered contrary to the moral law, since they are in opposition to the dignity both of hu-
man procreation and of the conjugal union.” JOHN D. ARRAS & BONNIE STEINBOCK, 
ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 425–34 (5th ed. 1999) (quoting Vatican, Congrega-
tion for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on 
the Dignity of Procreation, 40 ORIGINS 16, Mar. 19, 1987, abridged). 
 21. See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994); John A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood: Le-
gal and Ethical Issues in Human Egg Donation, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
 22. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 21. 
 23. In the words of Professor Robertson, “Procreative liberty should enjoy presumptive 
primacy when conflicts about its exercise arise because control over whether one reproduces or 
not is central to personal identity, to dignity, and to the meaning of one’s life.” Id. at 24. 
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governmental interference—not as a positive right to governmental 
assistance in the pursuit of any and all forms of reproduction. 
The reason that adoption falls short of satisfying this claimed 
right is that it fails to provide for the genetic or gestational bonds 
normally present between parents and children. Many individuals’ 
reproductive motivation stems in part from their perhaps narcissistic 
desire to pass on their genes, to use their genetic material to bring 
into the world a new being that shares and reflects their biological 
history. After all, argues evolutionary biology, is not the perpetuation 
of genetic lineage the fundamental basis of reproduction? 
Much has also been made of the symbolic and developmental 
importance of the mother-child bond formed during gestation. In 
fact, one of the primary arguments against surrogacy arrangements 
stems from the belief that the woman who carries a child during 
pregnancy is undeniably its “mother” and that any attempt to re-
nounce this reality is unethical and untenable.24 But adoption does 
exactly that; it makes parents out of people who share no genetic or 
gestational tie with the child. This point is not meant to deny or dis-
parage the loving bond that obviously exists between parents and 
their adopted children. It is only to argue that limiting noncoital re-
productive choices to adoption denies individuals incapable of coital 
reproduction the opportunity to experience the parent-child bond in 
its entirety. 
If one does accept these arguments for the availability and option 
of assisted reproduction, another question follows: Do we need so 
many different types of assisted reproduction? As noted above, re-
productive medicine currently offers artificial insemination, in vitro 
fertilization, gamete donation, embryo donation, and surrogacy to 
its patrons. And, like clockwork, new techniques continue to 
emerge.25 Are they all necessary in the name of procreative liberty, or 
are some of them unnecessarily redundant? 
 
 
 24. See generally BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY 
AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (1989) (propounding that, regardless of the 
source of the gametes, the woman who gestates a child is that child’s “mother,” and, therefore, 
institutions such as surrogacy, which treat the gestating mother merely as a “rented womb,” 
are inappropriate). 
 25. Most recently, scientists have perfected techniques for reversing menopause and its 
attendant infertility by re-implanting ovaries into such women. See, e.g., Stolberg, supra note 
17, at 1. 
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The answer is they all are necessary—if one accepts the proposi-
tion that all individuals have the right to procreate, even if doing so 
requires technological assistance. This is because the various tech-
niques serve patient populations with differing procreative needs. 
Take, for example, artificial insemination (AI). Sperm from the part-
ner is artificially deposited into the fallopian tube of an ovulating 
woman in order to maximize the chance of oocyte fertilization. This 
is done primarily to counter so called “male factor” infertility, such 
as low sperm count or impaired sperm motility. It allows the couple 
to maintain all of the traditional genetic and gestational ties with 
their child.26 In vitro fertilization (IVF), on the other hand, in which 
oocytes are removed from a woman, fertilized in the laboratory, and 
reimplanted in the uterus, is usually employed to overcome “female 
factor” infertility, such as anatomical blockage of the fallopian tubes. 
Like AI, this technique allows the parents to maintain both genetic 
and gestational ties to the offspring.27 
But what about individuals who, for whatever reason, are either 
unable to produce their own gametes (oocytes or sperm) or are un-
willing to use their gametes in conception due to fear of transmitting 
genetic disease to their offspring? This is where gamete donation 
comes in. Sperm from a third-party donor may be used for AI, or an 
oocyte from a third-party donor may be used for IVF. Such tech-
niques do not provide for all of the traditional genetic and gesta-
tional relationships, as one of the parents no longer provides a ge-
netic contribution. But it comes as close as possible. One parent is 
still genetically related to the offspring, and the gestational relation-
ship remains intact. In embryo donation, both the sperm and the 
oocyte for IVF are donated by third parties, so no genetic relation-
ship remains, but, again, allowing the rearing mother to carry the 
child maximizes parent-child biological ties. 
Lastly, there is surrogacy, in which couples arrange for a third-
party female to carry the pregnancy when the woman is unable to do 
so for anatomic or physiologic reasons. Here, the gestational bond is 
lost, but genetic ties can be maintained, provided that both the oo-
cyte and the sperm come from the couple, not third party donors. 
 
 26. Unless the sperm is obtained from a donor, in which case only the mother maintains 
a genetic tie to the offspring. This is discussed infra, Part II.C, as a form of gamete donation. 
 27. Again, this assumes that the infertile couple themselves, and not third-party donors, 
donates both the oocyte and the sperm. 
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If the rights to procreative liberty and to the maintenance of bio-
logical connections between parents and children justify the exis-
tence of assisted reproduction, then the same arguments justify the 
existence of different ARTs to overcome corresponding procreative 
roadblocks. Having briefly surveyed the justifications for the various 
ARTs, we now turn to take a closer look at oocyte donation. 
B. How Does It Work? 
The first step in oocyte donation is the selection of a donor.28 
This can be accomplished in one of three ways. First, the recipient 
couple (or individual) can seek the oocyte from a close friend or fam-
ily member, potentially obviating the need for an arms-length market 
transaction. Other benefits include personal knowledge and trust of 
the donor. However, finding such a donor is not always possible, 
and it may not be desirable even when it is an option. Genetically re-
lated family members may not be suitable if the risk of genetic dis-
ease transmission was the impetus for oocyte donation in the first 
place. In addition, close pre-existing donor-recipient relationships 
may lead to awkward and difficult familial and/or social relationships 
after a successful or unsuccessful donation. 
Understandably, recipients may prefer to avoid these potentiali-
ties and instead seek a disinterested donor, which leads to the other 
two options for donor selection: pooled brokerage or individual ad-
vertisement. There are multitudes of companies across the country 
that have amassed oocyte donor databases, catering to the needs of 
those in search of the “ideal” donor.29 Such companies lay the 
 
 28. Couples must also select a supervising physician at the outset, but this is not a diffi-
cult hurdle. Over three hundred fertility clinics now exist across the country that specialize in 
assisted reproductive technologies, most of which offer oocyte donation as an option. For a 
comprehensive list of these clinics, see CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION ET 
AL., 1997 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY 
AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS (1999). 
 29. Two of the largest providers, now accessible through the Internet, are Egg Dona-
tion, Inc., which can be found at <http://www.eggdonor.com>, and Options, located at 
<http://www.fertilityoptions.com>. Both sites provide extensive explanations of the medical 
protocol, associated costs, legal and ethical issues, and frequently asked questions. They also 
have online donor registries, complete with photographs and profiles, which clients can search 
in order to locate donors that most suit their needs or preferences. Ron Harris’s online gamete 
auction also belongs in this category, but it differs in important aspects from the sources noted 
above. First, it fails to provide much in the way of educational materials. Second, it does not 
guarantee that each of its donors is actually available for donation. Third, it does not have a 
pre-set, standardized donor compensation structure. 
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groundwork for the recipient, seeking out a pool of potential donors, 
cataloging their various characteristics, and conducting the appropri-
ate medical, genetic, and psychological histories and tests. For a 
fee,30 the company will provide clients with access to the donor data-
base—complete with photographs and characteristic catalogs—
execute the contract once the client selects a suitable donor, and 
oversee the associated administrative and legal processes. The advan-
tages of using these pooled brokerages are the simplicity and the 
knowledge of working with experienced professionals. The draw-
back, however, is that the recipient is bound by the company’s regu-
lations and limited to a particular donor pool that may not contain a 
“perfect match.” 
The final option is individual advertisement. In this case, the re-
cipient, either alone or, more often, through some sort of third party 
representation, circulates targeted advertisements in search of donors 
that meet specific criteria, as did the couple discussed in Part I. This 
way, recipients can set their own terms, including qualifying criteria 
and donor compensation structure. The drawbacks, however, include 
a more labor-intensive search and lack of experienced guidance. 
Whichever process is used, individual donor selection is usually 
driven by the donor’s genetic, physical, psychological, and intellec-
tual characteristics, which, as discussed below, may or may not have 
any bearing on the resultant offspring’s characteristics. Once a donor 
is selected, the medical protocol begins.31 
In order for oocyte donation to work, the donor and recipient 
must synchronize their menstrual cycles. That way, the recipient’s 
uterus will be prepared to accept and house the embryos just after  
the oocytes are retrieved from the donor and fertilized in the labora-
tory.32 Therefore, both the donor and the recipient must undergo 
 
 30. For example, based on May 1998 figures, Egg Donation charges clients $4,000 for 
its services. However, this figure excludes the $2,500 donor fee, as well as medical bills, doc-
tor’s fees, medications, laboratory fees, air travel and accommodations. See Estimated Cost Sheet 
(visited Oct. 28, 2000) <http://www.eggdonor.com/ercost.html>. By contrast, as of Dec. 
10, 1999, Fertility Options charged clients approximately $3,500 for the same services. See Fee 
Schedules (visited Oct. 28, 2000) <http://www.fertilityoptions.com/html_pub/guid_ 
fa.htm>. 
 31. Although briefly summarized below, the medical protocol of oocyte donation is 
highly technical and complex. For an in-depth review of the process, see MARK V. SAUER, 
PRINCIPLES OF OOCYTE AND EMBRYO DONATION (1998). 
 32. I use plurals—embryos and oocytes—because fertility clinics typically reimplant as 
many fertilized oocytes as possible into the recipient, knowing that most will fail to survive the 
process. The more fertilized oocytes that are reimplanted, the better the chance that a success-
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hormonal manipulation. 
At the beginning of the donor’s cycle, she undergoes an ultra-
sound to examine her ovaries, as well as blood tests for relevant 
hormone levels. If the results are normal, the donor then begins a 
10–14 day course of subcutaneous injections of an ovulation sup-
pressant to guarantee that she does not enter the ovulatory phase be-
fore the recipient is ready to accept the donation. Following a second 
round of ultrasound and blood tests, the donor then begins a 7–10 
day course of intramuscular injections of an ovulation stimulant that 
will cause her to produce an abnormally large quantity of oocytes 
during that cycle. Progression is monitored by repeat ultrasounds. 
During this time, the recipient’s menstrual cycle is also brought 
under medical control through hormonal manipulation. When donor 
ovulation stimulation begins, the recipient is given estrogen-
containing pills to promote the development of the endometrial lin-
ing of her uterus, so that it will be receptive to embryo implantation. 
When the donor oocytes have fully developed, the donor receives 
a final injection of human chorionic gonadotropin (HCG), an en-
dogenous hormone that helps prepare her oocytes for retrieval. The 
recipient receives a final injection of progesterone, another endoge-
nous hormone, which further prepares the endometrium for embryo 
implantation. The oocytes are then removed from the donor during 
an outpatient procedure via a long needle inserted through the re-
productive tract and into the ovaries. The oocytes are sucked 
through the needle into a test tube and fertilized with the sperm 
from the recipient’s partner. Approximately three to five days later, 
the embryos are implanted into the recipient’s uterus.33 
Clearly then, this is not a quick and easy solution to the problem 
of infertility, and there is certainly the potential for adverse conse-
quences—both for the donor and the recipient—including anesthesia 
complications, hemorrhage, infection, ovarian hyperstimulation, and 
even death, although serious complications are exceedingly rare.34 
 
ful pregnancy will result. In rare cases, more than one will survive, resulting in a multiple preg-
nancy. If more than three embryos survive, patients must decide between commencing with an 
inherently high-risk pregnancy or selectively reducing the number through abortive tech-
niques. 
 33. Occasionally, if the yield is large enough, several of the embryos are frozen and 
stored in liquid nitrogen, in the event that the transfer does not lead to a successful pregnancy. 
In that case, the extra embryos are unfrozen and a second attempt is made at implantation. 
 34. See Rosenwaks & Damario, supra note 12, at 1435. In addition, it has been sug-
gested but not proven that an association exists between the use of fertility agents in ovarian 
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Granted, there are no invasive surgical procedures involved, and the 
risk of serious injury is small, but there is the discomfort of the daily 
injections and oocyte removal, and it is always possible that some un-
foreseen complication may arise. 
Having looked briefly at the costs and risks associated with the 
endeavor, what are the realistic benefits to be gained by particular-
ized donor selection? To answer this, we must first look at the ge-
netic principles that underlie the concept of oocyte donation. 
C. Genetic Realities and Misconceptions 
As was discussed earlier, the justification for the very existence of 
oocyte donation, as with all ARTs, is the exercise of procreative lib-
erty and the maintenance, as much as possible, of the biological ties 
between parents and children. Because the oocyte recipient is unable 
to share a genetic link with the offspring, what is to be gained by the 
selection of a particular donor? 
The theory, at least, is simple. By selecting a donor who shares 
particularly salient or relevant traits with the infertile woman, a cou-
ple can maximize the similarity between the resultant offspring and 
themselves. For example, the couple with the $50,000 advertisement 
decided that the most defining characteristics of the infertile woman 
were her height, her intellect, and her athleticism. Therefore, they 
sought potential donors who shared these characteristics, hoping 
that the resultant offspring would likewise posses these characteris-
tics, and thereby “fit the familial mold,” so to speak.35 
As straightforward as this matching theory sounds, it is premised 
on distortions and misconceptions of the laws of genetic inheritance. 
At its base, the matching theory conflates phenotype and genotype,  
 
 
hyperstimulation and ovarian carcinoma. See id. See Joan Hamilton, What Are The Costs?, 
STANFORD 52–8 (Nov./Dec. 2000) for a synopsis of a particularly unique adverse outcome in 
the case of an egg donor whose previously undiagnosed, benign pituitary tumor rapidly 
enlarged due to the hormonal injections involved in the donation, resulting in a temporary 
coma and permanent brain damage. 
 35. Of course there is no guarantee that all, or even most, couples using oocyte dona-
tion will limit their donor criteria to characteristics reminiscent of the infertile woman. Perhaps 
couples will instead seek donors who possess socially desirable characteristics, regardless of 
whether or not the infertile woman shares those characteristics. In fact, this “genetic engineer-
ing” conception of oocyte donation, as discussed in Part IV, is the basis of one of the most 
popular criticisms of such technology. For now, let us assume that the couples are picking do-
nors to match the infertile woman. 
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fails to appreciate the limitations of genetic determinism, and ignores 
the implications of multi-factorial inheritance.36 
An individual’s genotype is the set of genetic sequences that 
comprise the 46 DNA chromosomes in the normal human genome. 
These sequences are in turn comprised of billions of base pairs or-
ganized in random, sometimes repeating, strings. These base pairs 
can be thought of as individual letters in one’s genetic biography. 
However, there are only 4 different bases to choose from when con-
structing this story, akin to an alphabet that contains only four let-
ters. These strings of base pairs are then organized as triplets, or 3 
letter words, called codons. Now imagine an incredibly long run-on 
sentence comprised of thousands of these three letter words. This is 
a gene. And distributed throughout the human genome are thou-
sands of genes, which together contribute to, and even directly de-
termine many of, the salient characteristics of individuals. 
Phenotype, on the other hand, is the catalog of an individual’s 
outwardly observable characteristics. For example, eye color, height, 
intelligence, and athleticism are all phenotypic characteristics. And 
while it is true that one’s genotype strongly influences one’s pheno-
type, the two are not synonymous. 
Some phenotypic traits, such as eye color, are determined almost 
entirely by genotype. If an individual carries two genes that code for 
blue eyes, then she will have blue eyes. If an individual possesses two 
genes for brown eyes, then she will have brown eyes. And if she in-
herits one gene for blue eyes and one gene for brown eyes, due to 
the dominance of the brown eye gene, she will have brown eyes. 
This is simple Mendelian inheritance. 
Infertile couples can exploit such predictable genotype-
phenotype relationships when selecting donors. If the couple desires 
a child with blue eyes, and the husband has two genes for blue eyes, 
then selecting a donor with two genes for blue eyes virtually guaran-
tees that the resultant offspring will have blue eyes too. On the other 
hand, selecting a donor with two genes for brown eyes virtually 
guarantees that the child will have brown eyes. However, only a 
small proportion of phenotypic traits enjoy such genetic simplicity. 
Predominately, the one gene–one trait model does not hold true, for 
two reasons—the bounded validity of genetic determinism and the 
reality of multi-factorial inheritance. 
 
 36. For an overview of basic genetic theory, see BENJAMIN LEWIN, GENES VII (2000). 
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First, genotype is not the sole determinant of most phenotypic 
characteristics. Belief to the contrary is an oversubscription to the 
theory of genetic determinism. Countless studies, specifically studies 
of identical (or monozygotic) twins, demonstrate that even geneti-
cally identical individuals are just those—individuals.37 Despite the 
fact that such twins have identical genotypes, they often exhibit 
marked disparities in a wide range of phenotypic characteristics. 
Clearly, factors other than genotypic profile play a role in phenotype, 
proving that the xeroxing myth—the belief that identical genotypes 
result in identical persons—really is just a myth.38 
Genetic endowment is only part of the equation. External fac-
tors, such as environment, also play a large role in the phenotypic 
development of individuals. Intellect and athleticism must be fos-
tered and achieved, not merely inherited. This is not to deny that 
certain individuals are genetically predisposed to keener intellect or 
better coordination, but the role genes can play in these realms is 
only so large. Intuitively, the child whose mind and body are stimu-
lated develops greater intellect and athleticism than the child who is 
ignored or discouraged, regardless of identical underlying genotypes. 
Environmental factors can also have detrimental effects on pheno-
typic development. For example, childhood exposure to lead can de-
crease intelligence,39 and certain pesticides can damage the nervous 
system, leading to loss of coordination.40 
 
 37. See Peter McGuffin & Neilson Martin, Science, Medicine and the Future: Behaviour 
and Genes, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 37, 38 (1999) (summarizing results of twin studies showing 
significant discordance among monozygotic twins along various disease dimensions such as 
childhood fatigue, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, bulemia, depression, autism, and 
schizophrenia); Louis Keith & Geoffrey Machin, Zygosity Testing: Current Status and Evolving 
Issues, 42 J. REPRO. MED. 699, 704–06 (1997) (noting numerous mechanisms by which 
monozygotic twins can become discordant during gestation and delivery). 
 38. Therefore, even if one were to clone oneself, resulting in a second being with identi-
cal genotype, that clone would still likely differ phenotypically from the primary. 
 39. Michael V. Johnston & Gary W. Goldstein, Selective Vulnerability of the Developing 
Brain to Lead, 11 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROLOGY 689 (1998); Herbert L. Needleman & 
Constantine A. Gatsonis, Low-Level Lead Exposure and the IQ of Children: A Meta-Analysis of 
Modern Studies, 263 JAMA 673 (1990); Wei-Tsuen Soong et al., Long-Term Effect of Increased 
Lead Absorption on Intelligence of Children, 54 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 297 (1999); Shilu 
Tong et al., Lifetime Exposure to Environmental Lead and Children’s Intelligence at 11–13 
Years: The Port Pirie Cohort Study, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 1569 (1996); Gail A. Wasserman et al., 
Lead Exposure and Intelligence in 7-Year-Old Children: The Yugoslavia Prospective Study, 105 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS. 956 (1997). 
 40. See Donald C. Cole et al., Assessment of Peripheral Nerve Function in an Ecuadorian 
Rural Population Exposed to Pesticides, 55 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 77 (1998); 
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A second genetic reality that complicates the predictability of off-
spring’s phenotype is the existence of multifactorial inheritance. Even 
when a particular phenotypic trait, such as height, is primarily deter-
mined by genetics, it is likely that the ultimate phenotypic resolution 
is a result of complex interactions between many different genes, not 
just one or two.41 Traits whose transmission depends on such genetic 
interplay are said to be multifactorial in nature. Unlike eye color, 
such traits cannot be reliably predicted because the presence or ab-
sence of a particular gene is only part of the equation. 
In addition to the genetic limitations discussed above, incom-
plete understanding and information also bind any phenotypic predi-
cations. Science has yet to identify all of the genes that play roles in 
the development of each phenotypic characteristic, so any predictive 
model promises to be incomplete. This will, of course, change dra-
matically as the Human Genome Project proceeds and the entire 
complement of human genes is cataloged.42 This project, which en-
deavors to map the entire human genome, will provide us with a 
much more detailed and accurate understanding of the genetic de-
terminants of human existence. As more and more genes are deline-
ated, it will become possible to select for more and more phenotypic 
traits, within the constraints of the aforementioned limitations of ge-
netic determinism. 
The relevance of all this for oocyte donation is clear. Despite 
common misconceptions, a couple cannot meaningfully guarantee 
through targeted donor selection that resultant offspring will possess 
complex phenotypic traits such as tall stature, sharp intellect, or ath-
 
Elizabeth A. Guillette et al., An Anthropological Approach to the Evaluation of Preschool Chil-
dren Exposed to Pesticides in Mexico, 106 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS. 347 (1998). 
 41. Physical size, for example, depends on the interaction of a large set of genetic prod-
ucts, including the cells that produce certain growth factors, the receptors through which those 
growth factors exert their influence, and the substances that normally act to down-regulate 
growth factor responsiveness at the end of puberty. The presence of abnormal forms of any of 
these genes could result in abnormalities in height at either end of the spectrum. Particularly 
unpredictable are the effects of non-dominant, or recessive, traits. 
 42. The Human Genome Project is a federally funded, joint public-private venture to 
map the entire human genome. Although the first phase of the Project, the initial sequencing 
of DNA base pairs, is almost finished, much remains to be done before significant genetic ap-
plications will emerge. Most importantly, researchers must now determine which strands of 
DNA code for functional proteins and what roles these proteins play in normal and diseased 
physiology. For a brief explanation and overview of the project, see Albert H. Teich & Mark S. 
Frankel, Introduction: Genetic Testing and the Human Genome Project, in THE GENETIC 
FRONTIER: ETHICS, LAW, AND POLICY xiii (Mark S. Frankel & Albert H. Teich eds., 1994). 
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letic prowess. Simple genetic sequences do not determine complex 
phenotypic traits. Granted, children do tend to resemble their par-
ents, even with respect to complex traits, such that tall donors are 
more likely to produce tall offspring than short donors.43 However, 
as discussed above, this outcome is far from certain. 
So what are the normative implications of these genetic realities? 
Does the attenuated link between genotype and phenotype justify 
some sort of restriction on oocyte donor compensation? Should we 
prohibit couples from paying so much money for so little certainty? 
No. Short of factors such as fraud, misrepresentation, or illegality, 
who are we to say that $50,000 is an unreasonable amount to pay 
for the chance of a baby that resembles its parents? And maybe that 
is all these couples are paying for—a chance, not a guarantee. As will 
be discussed in Part V, some sort of regulation may be needed to en-
sure that infertile couples fully understand what it is they are pur-
chasing. However, uncertainty, in and of itself, is no reason to ban 
such transactions. Certainly, other compelling justifications may ex-
ist. For example, maybe institutions such as oocyte donation further 
intolerance of disabilities or undermine the pluralistic values so cen-
tral to our democratic and diverse nation. But without further explo-
ration and analysis of these potential insidious consequences, pater-
nalistic regulation solely in the name of uncertainty serves only to 
undermine autonomy and procreative liberty. 
With an understanding of the genetics and processes that under-
lie oocyte donation, it is time to survey the current regulatory cli-
mate, both domestic and foreign. 
D. Current Regulatory State 
Despite the prolonged existence and growing popularity of oo-
cyte donation, there is a surprising paucity of legislation on the mat-
ter in the United States. Legislation that does exist is variable and 
ambiguous, tending to confuse more than clarify. Much of the rele-
vant regulation consists of the few federal and state statutes concern-
ing IVF, which necessarily implicate oocyte donation because of its 
reliance on IVF technology. These statutes generally fall into three 
 
 43. Due to the statistical reality of regression to the mean, however, the offspring of two 
very tall parents are likely to be shorter than the parents themselves. This is the same for any 
character trait. Each successive generation tends to regress towards the social mean for any par-
ticular trait. 
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categories: 1) gamete donor medical screening guidelines, 2) clinic 
reporting requirements, and 3) insurance coverage guidelines. 
Several states require that all gamete donors undergo medical 
screening prior to donation to avoid the transmission of genetic or 
infectious disease.44 Some require IVF clinics to report various suc-
cess rates to potential clients and the Department of Health.45 The 
United States Congress has also intervened at this level via the Fertil-
ity Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992.46 The Act, 
among other things, mandates that each fertility clinic report annu-
ally its pregnancy success rates achieved through fertility programs to 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC, 
in turn, publishes these rates in a yearly national report on assisted 
reproduction and fertility clinics.47 
A number of state statutes address insurance coverage of IVF 
costs.48 The majority of these laws mandate insurance coverage of the 
 
 44. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:14 (1999) (“No gamete shall be used in 
an in vitro fertilization or preembryo transfer procedure, unless the gamete donor has been 
medically evaluated and the results, documented in accordance with rules adopted by the divi-
sion of public health services, demonstrate the medical acceptability of the person as a gamete 
donor.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-45.3 (Michie 1999) (“Any person using donor gametes to 
treat patients for infertility by artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian 
tube transfer, or zygote intrafallopian tube transfer or any other gamete, zygote or embryo 
transfer or other intervening medical technology using sperm or ova, shall, prior to using any 
donor gametes for such procedures, ascertain the HIV status of the donor through testing as 
provided in Board of Health regulations.”). 
 45. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-85-137(e) (Michie 1999) (stating that in vitro fer-
tilization clinics must demonstrate “a reasonable success rate with both fertilization and births” 
in order to maintain certification for insurance purposes); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.  
§ 3213(E) (1999) (requiring all persons conducting in vitro fertilization to file quarterly re-
ports with the Department of Health, including the number of eggs fertilized, the number of 
fertilized eggs destroyed or discarded, and the number of women implanted with a fertilized 
egg); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2971.1 (Michie 1999) (requiring physicians to disclose to all 
IVF patients the rates of success for the procedure at the clinic or hospital where the procedure 
is to be performed, including the total number of births, the number of live births as a per-
centage of completed retrieval cycles, and the rates for clinical pregnancy and delivery per 
completed retrieval cycle bracketed by age groups). 
 46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -4 (Supp. V 1993). 
 47. For 1997, the report found that, nationally, approximately 40 live births were 
achieved per 100 transfers of fresh (as opposed to frozen) donor oocytes (i.e., a national suc-
cess rate of 40% for fresh oocyte donation). CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION ET AL., supra note 28, at 41. 
 48. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-85-137(a) (Michie 1999) (“All disability insurance 
companies doing business in this state shall include, as a covered expense, in vitro fertiliza-
tion.”); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55(a) (Deering 1999) (“[E]very health care 
service plan contract . . . shall offer coverage for the treatment of infertility, except in vitro fer-
tilization . . . .”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10A-116.5 (Michie 1999) (“All individual 
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costs of IVF, but they also set qualifications for provider reimburse-
ment. As a means for quality control, clinics are typically required to 
conform to the IVF guidelines of the American College of Obstetrics 
and Gynecology (ACOG) or the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine (ASRM) (formerly known as the American Fertility Soci-
ety) in order to qualify for reimbursement.49 However, a few states 
explicitly exclude oocyte donation from these insurance regulations 
by further restricting coverage to the fertilization of the insured indi-
vidual’s own gamete with that of his or her spouse.50 Therefore, IVF 
procedures that use third-party donors, such as sperm and oocyte 
donation, are specifically excluded from mandatory insurance cover-
age in these states. 
 
and group health insurance policies which provide pregnancy-related benefits shall include in 
addition to other benefits for treating infertility, a one-time only benefit for all outpatient ex-
penses arising from in vitro fertilization procedures . . . .”); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/356m(a) (West 1999) (requiring that all group health insurance policies providing coverage 
for more than 25 employees and providing pregnancy-related benefits must contain coverage 
for the diagnosis and treatment of infertility, including in vitro fertilization and embryo trans-
fer); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810(b) (1999) (forbidding health insurance policies that 
provide pregnancy-related benefits from excluding benefits for all outpatient expenses arising 
from in vitro fertilization); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.51-6 (West 1999) (stating that all 
health insurers shall offer and make available coverage for expenses that arise from in vitro fer-
tilization procedures). 
 49. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-85-137(d) (Michie 1999) (limiting insurance cov-
erage for IVF to procedures performed at medical facilities that are certified by the Department 
of Health and either conform to the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ 
guidelines for IVF clinics or meet the American Fertility Society minimal standards for IVF 
programs); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10A-116.5 (Michie 1999) (limiting insurance cov-
erage of IVF to procedures performed at medical facilities that conform to the American Col-
lege of Obstetric and Gynecology guidelines for IVF clinics or to the American Fertility Society 
minimal standards for IVF programs); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m(b)(1)(C) (West 
1999) (limiting IVF coverage to procedures performed at medical facilities that conform to 
either the American College of Obstetric and Gynecology or the American Fertility Society 
standards for IVF clinics); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810(c)(5) (1999) (limiting insurance 
coverage of IVF to those procedures performed at medical facilities that conform with either 
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists or the American Fertility Society 
guidelines for IVF clinics); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.51-6 (West 1999) (limiting insurance 
coverage to IVF procedures performed at medical facilities that conform to the American Col-
lege of Obstetric and Gynecology or the American Fertility Society guidelines for IVF clinics). 
 50. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10A-116.5 (Michie 1999) (limiting insur-
ance coverage to IVF cycles in which the patient’s own oocytes are fertilized with the patient’s 
spouse’s sperm); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810(c)(2) (1999) (limiting insurance coverage to 
IVF cycles in which the patient’s own oocytes are fertilized with the patient’s spouse’s sperm); 
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.51-6 (West 1999) (limiting insurance coverage to IVF cycles in 
which “fertilization or attempt at fertilization of the patient’s oocytes is made only with the 
patient’s spouse’s sperm”). 
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Of course individual IVF clinics have their own internal regula-
tions and policies, including donor screening criteria and the provi-
sion of relevant data to prospective clients, but such guidelines are 
variable and entirely voluntary. 
Turning to the narrower topic of oocyte donor compensation, 
federal law is entirely silent, and only a handful of state statutes di-
rectly address the issue. Louisiana is the only state that explicitly pro-
hibits the sale of human oocytes,51 and Virginia is the only state that 
explicitly sanctions the sale of human oocytes.52 Some states, while 
not expressly mentioning oocytes, have statutes that broadly ban the 
sale of all body parts for valuable consideration,53 usually with excep-
tions for blood products and human hair.54 
 
 51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 2000) (“The sale of a human ovum, fertilized 
human ovum, or human embryo is expressly prohibited.”) A Florida statute explicitly bans the 
transfer of any “human embryo” for valuable consideration, but this does not apply to isolated 
gametes like semen and oocytes. FLA. STAT. ch. 873.05 (1999). 
 52. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (Michie 1999) (exempting “ova” from the general 
ban on the sale of body parts for any reason). 
 53. “Valuable consideration” is typically defined so as to exclude associated medical 
costs, the donor’s out-of-pocket expenses, and lost wages incurred by the donor in connection 
with the donation. 
 54. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-280a (1999) (banning the “transfer for valuable con-
sideration any human organ for use in human transplantation” but excluding hair, blood, or 
blood components from the definition of “human organ”); FLA. STAT. ch. 873.01 (1999) 
(banning the transfer of any human organ, tissue, or body part for valuable consideration and 
leaving the parameters of coverage of these terms up to the Agency for Health Care Admini-
stration); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-20 (West 1999) (making the sale of “any part of 
the human body” a crime but excluding blood and its components, other body fluids, and 
human hair from the ban); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-5-1 (Michie 1999) (prohibiting transfers 
of human organs for use in human transplantation but limiting definition of “human organs” 
to kidneys, liver, heart, lung, cornea, eye, bone marrow, bone, pancreas, or skin); MD. CODE 
ANN., HEALTH–GEN. I § 5-408(a) (1999) (banning the sale or transfer of any human organ 
or part of a body); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.10204 (1999) (proscribing the transfer of hu-
man organs or part of human organs for valuable consideration for any purpose, but limiting 
the definition of “human organ” and exempting blood, blood components, other self-
replicating body fluids, and human hair from the ban); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.460 (Mi-
chie 2000) (prohibiting the “transfer for valuable consideration any human organ for use in 
human transplantation” but excluding blood from the definition of “human organ”); N.Y. 
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4307 (Consol. 1999) (prohibiting the “transfer for valuable considera-
tion any human organ for use in human transplantation” but excluding blood from the defini-
tion of “human organ”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.12(A) (Anderson 1999) (prohibiting 
the transfer of “a human organ, tissue, or eye for transplantation”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-
30-401 (1999) (banning the transfer of “any human organ for valuable consideration and for 
use in human transplantation if the transfer affects commerce”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.  
§ 48.02(b) (West 1999) (making transfers of “any human organ for valuable consideration” a 
crime but excluding hair, blood, or blood components from the definition of “human organ”); 
W. VA. CODE § 16-19-7a (2000) (banning the “transfer for valuable consideration any human 
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Other states limit commercial bans to solid organs or nonrenew-
able or nonregenerative tissues,55 which arguably do not apply to 
human oocytes. Unlike solid organs, oocytes are, for all practical 
purposes, replenishable.56 The average woman has approximately 
400,000 pre-oocytes (cells capable of becoming oocytes) in her ova-
ries at puberty.57 While it is true that this number is finite, the supply 
of oocytes is, in reality, unlimited. Under normal conditions, every 
month that a woman menstruates, only one of these precursor cells 
differentiates into a mature oocyte under the influence of an intricate 
set of hormone-driven processes.58 The average woman menstruates 
for about 35–40 years, or 500 months.59 Therefore, under normal 
conditions, a woman never comes even close to using up all of her 
potential oocytes. Every month, a new set of precursors begins to 
 
organ for use in human transplantation,” leaving the definition of “human organ or tissue” to 
the director of health but explicitly exempting blood); WIS. STAT. § 146.345 (1999) (stating 
that “[n]o person may knowingly and for valuable consideration . . . transfer any human organ 
for use in human organ transplantation” but limiting the definition of “human organ” and 
explicitly excluding blood, blood components, and semen from the definition). It is notewor-
thy that many of these statutes only prohibit such sales for the single purpose of transplanta-
tion, raising the interesting question of whether oocyte donation for IVF qualifies as transplan-
tation. However, the broad definition of “transplantation” generally used by the medical 
profession suggests that it does. See, e.g., STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1840 (Marjory 
Spraycar ed., 26th ed. 1995) (defining transplantation as “[i]mplanting in one part a tissue or 
organ taken from another part or from another individual”). Then again, one could argue that 
oocytes are not implanted. 
 55. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f (Deering 1999) (banning the transfer of “any 
human organ, for purposes of transplantation, for valuable consideration” but excluding from 
“human organ” plasma, sperm, and any other renewable or regenerative tissue not otherwise 
specified); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.10204 (1999) (excluding “self-replicating body fluids” 
not otherwise named from the general ban); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10025 (1999) (banning 
the “transfer for transplantation or other medical therapy [of] any human organ or nonregen-
erative tissue for valuable consideration”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-26-42 (Michie 2000) 
(excluding plasma, sperm, and any other renewable or regenerative tissue not otherwise named 
from the definition of “human organ” for purposes of the ban). 
 56. It is true that livers are now somewhat replenishable, perhaps blurring the line sug-
gested here. But the fact that almost all of the relevant statutes expressly include livers within 
the ban makes that observation somewhat immaterial. Regardless of the regenerative capacities 
of the liver, legislatures have unambiguously established their intent to include livers within the 
ban. The same cannot be said of oocytes. 
 57. See F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 58 (20th ed. 1997). 
 58. Although only one mature oocyte is produced per menstrual cycle, as many as 30 
precursors will begin to differentiate and maturate. At some point, one of these candidates be-
comes the dominant follicle, resulting in the death of the others. Therefore, although only one 
oocyte is produced per cycle, many of the precursors are destroyed. For a general description of 
the physiology underlying menstruation, see id. at 81–84. 
 59. Id. at 58. 
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differentiate, and, every month, one mature oocyte emerges from the 
ovaries. Although limited at some point by the finite number of pre-
oocytes, oocytes are entirely replenishable throughout a woman’s re-
productive life. It is therefore unlikely that oocyte donors will prema-
turely run out of oocytes prior to menopause. 
As noted above, other replenishable tissues, such as sperm and 
blood, are traditionally exempted from the general ban on the com-
modification of tissue. Thousands of sperm banks exist across the 
country, offering modest yet significant financial remuneration to 
donors. And despite the Red Cross’s impressive volunteer blood do-
nor network, a notable market exists for blood, particularly rare 
blood types. In fact, some individuals with extremely rare blood 
types have commanded so much money for their scarce biological re-
source that they have supported themselves entirely through such 
donations.60 Most states have chosen to ban the sale of only organs 
or nonreplenishable tissues, and exceptions based on regenerative 
capacities or replenishable reservoirs should logically apply equally to 
blood, sperm, and oocytes. 
Beyond the few state and federal IVF statutes and the highly 
variable and ambiguous state statutes that regulate the sale of human 
body parts, there is no legislation in the United States that regulates 
the practice of oocyte donation. In contrast, many other countries 
not only have extensive national oocyte donation regulations in gen-
eral but also possess guidelines that specifically address oocyte donor 
compensation. 
In England, IVF clinics, including those that provide oocyte do-
nation, are licensed and regulated by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) pursuant to the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act.61 In addition to licensing and setting practice 
and screening standards, HFEA also collects and publishes success 
rates of fertility clinics in its patient’s guide. More important for this 
discussion, HFEA enforces a 15£ ($25) limit on donor compensa-
tion, in addition to expenses incurred, for the express purpose of 
 
 60. See United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing the conviction 
of Dorothy Garber for tax evasion when she failed to claim the income she received from re-
peated sales of her rare blood, which she used to support herself and three children); Green v. 
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1229 (1980) (determining the taxable nature of income derived from 
the sale of blood by Margaret Green, who supported herself through repeated sales of her rare 
AB-negative blood). 
 61. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37 (Eng.). 
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preventing the commodification of oocytes.62 As one HFEA member 
said, “In this country we have a 15 [pound] limit because we don’t 
believe egg donation should be subject to the same whims as any 
other product in the market place.”63 
In Israel, the Ministry of Health oversees fertility practices, limit-
ing both oocyte donor eligibility and compensation. Under present 
ministry guidelines, only women undergoing IVF themselves may 
donate oocytes,64 and no payment beyond expenses incurred may be 
made for a donated ovum.65 
In Australia, Commonwealth regulations require fertility clinic li-
censure, extensive participant screening, and mandatory outcome re-
porting.66 In addition, regulations forbid the giving or receiving of 
valuable consideration in exchange for donation of reproductive ma-
terial, beyond reimbursement for costs incurred.67 
Clearly then, many countries do not share the United States’ lack 
of federal governmental oversight of fertility practices and donor 
compensation. But what are the implications of this reality? Should 
the United States government play a more active role in the regula-
tion of oocyte donation? What are the arguments for and against 
greater governmental intervention? Many of the central arguments 
derive from the more general debate over the commodification of 
transplant organs. The following part therefore surveys the legisla-
tion and underlying policy arguments concerning the sale of organs. 
The subsequent part addresses arguments specific to the reproduc-
tive context. 
 
 62. Through a controversial new project, women can also receive free IVF treatment for 
themselves if they donate half of the oocytes retrieved to other infertile women. The oocyte 
recipients then finance the procedure. See Sarah Chalmers & Becky Morris, Scandal of the Egg 
Donations, DAILY MAIL (London), Sept. 21, 1999, at 37. 
 63. Nicole Veash, Internet Donors Offer Perfect Babies to Order, THE OBSERVER, Aug. 
15, 1999, at 3. 
 64. See generally Judy Siegel, Groups Voice Support for Liberalizing Ova Donations, 
JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 2, 2000, at 4. A recently introduced bill would remove the current 
eligibility requirement and thereby allow any woman to donate oocytes for IVF. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See Infertility Treatment Act, 1995 (Austl.). 
 67. See Reproductive Technology Code of Ethical Clinical Practice, 1995 (Austl.). 
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III. THE SALE OF ORGANS AND TISSUES IN GENERAL 
A. Current Legal Environment68 
Federal law prohibits the sale of human organs. The Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA)69 and the National Organ Transplant 
Act of 1984 (NOTA)70 set out the federal government’s position on 
donor compensation. Both NOTA and UAGA contain anti-
commodification provisions that illustrate congressional concerns 
over subjecting life-saving organs to market forces. For example, 
UAGA section 10 states, “A person may not knowingly, for valuable 
consideration, purchase or sell a [human body] part for transplanta-
tion or therapy, if removal of the part is intended to occur after the 
death of the decedent.”71 The language expressly limits its applica-
tion to situations in which the body part in question is removed after 
the death of the donor and hence does not apply to oocyte donation. 
NOTA section 274e states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any 
person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any hu-
man organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplanta-
tion if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”72 The authority to 
promulgate the precise inclusion criteria for “human organ” is dele-
gated to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
 
 68. For an excellent and comprehensive history of legislation in the realm of body parts 
prior to 1980, see RUSSELL SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY (1981). 
 69. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act (1987). The UAGA was originally enacted in 1968 in 
response to the need for a consistent and coordinated organ donation system in the United 
States. For more information about the Act, see Alfred M. Sadler, Jr., et al., The Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act: A Model for Reform, 206 JAMA 2501 (1968). See also SCOTT, supra note 68, 
at 66–74 (providing history of the development of the UAGA). 
 70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–74 (2000). NOTA established the current organ donation and 
allocation system that is run by the United Network of Organ Sharing (UNOS). UNOS is a 
private, non-profit organization that contracts with the Department of Health and Human 
Services to implement transplant organ trafficking. 
 71. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 10(a) (1987). Section 10(b) goes on to state that 
“[v]aluable consideration does not include reasonable payment for the removal, processing, 
disposal, preservation, quality control, storage, transportation, or implantation of a part.” Sec-
tion 10(c) makes violations of this section a felony subject to a fine up to $50,000, imprison-
ment up to five years, or both. 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000). Section 274e(b) sets forth the same penalties for viola-
tion as the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, and § 274e(c)(2) provides a definition of “valuable 
consideration” that is similar to that contained in the UAGA. Of note, however, is the inclu-
sion in this definition of “expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of 
a human organ in connection with the donation of the organ.” 
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vices,73 who, as of yet, has not extended the definition to include 
human oocytes. 
In addition, the states have adopted the UAGA anti-
commodification provision as part of their own anatomical gift acts.74 
Further, the U.S. Task Force on Organ Transplantation espouses the 
view that compensation should not be allowed for transplant or-
gans.75 However, as with NOTA and UAGA, the language of these 
statutes and position statements arguably foreclose their application 
to oocyte donation. 
Existing case law has little to add to this discussion. The leading 
case is Moore v. Regents of the University of California.76 Plaintiff 
John Moore underwent treatment for leukemia at the UCLA Medi-
cal Center. As part of this treatment, doctors removed Moore’s 
spleen. Although the splenectomy was medically indicated to treat 
the disease, Moore’s doctors failed to disclose their ulterior motives 
for doing so. Because of the unique nature of the diseased cells, the 
doctor’s were able to establish an immortal cell line from the tissue 
(named the Mo cell line, after Moore), which had tremendous scien-
tific commercial value—estimated to run into the billions. However, 
the doctors never disclosed their economic interests to Moore, and 
he did not discover the truth until years later. When he finally did 
learn of the financial motivations behind his splenectomy, Moore 
sued the doctors, the Medical Center, and the University of Califor-
nia for damages based on theories of conversion, breach of fiduciary 
duty, and lack of informed consent. 
 
 
 73. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (2000). 
 74. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-19-40 to -47 (2000) (“Alabama Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-841 to -852 (2000) (“Revised Arizona Anatomical Gift Act”); 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7150–57 (West 2000) (“Uniform Anatomical Gift Act”). 
One state recently enacted legislation that provides families of deceased donors with up to 
$3000 “for reasonable hospital and other expenses, funeral expenses and incidental expenses 
incurred by the donor or donor’s family in connection with making a vital organ donation.” 20 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 8622(B)(1) (2000). The legality of these payments, intended to increase 
donation rates, is still in doubt, as it is not yet clear whether such payments would violate 
NOTA. In an attempt to circumvent this prohibition, the Pennsylvania plan transfers the 
money directly to a funeral home, hospital, or other service provider, not to the family of the 
donor, so that arguably no valuable consideration goes directly to the donating party. See id. 
 75. See U.S. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATIONS: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDA- 
TIONS (1986). 
 76. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
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The trial court sustained the defendants’ general demurrer to the 
causes of action. After a court of appeals reversed, finding that 
Moore had adequately stated a cause for conversion,77 the California 
Supreme Court heard the case on review. First, the court held that a 
cause of action for conversion could not be sustained. Conversion 
requires that the plaintiff establish interference with ownership or 
rights of possession.78 The court reasoned that, since Moore did not 
expect to retain possession of his cells following their removal, his 
conversion claim could only be maintained on a theory of ownership 
interest.79 However, the court found that neither case law nor state 
statutory law supported the claim that Moore maintained an owner-
ship interest in his excised tissue.80 Further, the court concluded that 
policy considerations counseled against extending the conversion 
tort to encompass the present claim.81 Most compelling to the court 
was the prospect that assigning ownership rights to those in Moore’s 
situation would have a chilling effect on medical research and tech-
nological progress, endeavors that significantly outweigh any indi-
vidual’s right to share in the profits derived from his or her excised 
tissue.82 
Second, the court reasoned that the law could protect patients 
such as Moore without resorting to the theory of conversion.83 As 
the court stated, “Liability based upon existing disclosure obliga-
tions, rather than an unprecedented extension of the conversion the-
ory, protects patients’ rights of privacy and autonomy without un-
necessarily hindering research.”84 As fiduciaries, Moore’s doctors had 
an obligation to disclose all conflicts of interest and material informa-
tion to their patient in order to obtain truly informed consent. Be-




 77. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
 78. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 488. 
 79. See id. at 488–89. 
 80. See id. at 488–93. 
 81. See id. at 493–97. 
 82. See id. at 493 (noting that important policy considerations dictate that “we not 
threaten with disabling civil liability innocent parties who are engaged in socially useful activi-
ties, such as researchers who have no reason to believe that their use of a particular cell sample 
is, or may be, against a donor’s wishes”). 
 83. See id. at 493–95. 
 84. Id. at 494. 
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causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty or lack of informed con-
sent.85 
The importance of this case in the context of oocyte donation is 
the proposition that individuals do not maintain a property interest 
in removed body parts sufficient to maintain a cause of action for 
conversion, at least according to the California Supreme Court. Such 
a conclusion raises the possibility that, like Moore, oocyte donors 
lack a significant property interest in their tissue once it is removed. 
Therefore, it is conceivable that courts could preclude donors from 
maintaining an action for breach of contract in the event that the re-
cipients failed to honor the compensation clause of the donation 
contract. It is not at all clear, however, that the similarities between 
these two scenarios sufficiently outweigh the differences to justify 
parallel legal treatment.86 
Though problematic, this analysis suggests a possible alternative 
to free alienability or strict anti-commodification regulation, which 
will be expanded upon later. In short, though, society could allow 
market-based oocyte donor compensation but at the same time limit 
or foreclose legal enforcement of such contracts based on this impli-
cation of the Moore decision. Oocyte donors would have no standing 
to bring suits for breach of contract if a recipient failed to honor the 
contract once the oocyte was removed. Likewise, courts could hold 
that recipients have no property interest in the tissue of others, such 
that they could not bring suit if donors failed to honor the contract 
once the compensation was provided. Again, this possible resolution 
will be revisited later. 
While it appears that the current federal and state guidelines that 
prohibit the transfer of organs for valuable consideration do not 
 
 85. See id. at 483–85. 
 86. Central to the Moore Court’s position was the realization that Moore had at no time 
prior to its removal conceived of his spleen as a valuable commodity. Indeed, he most likely 
viewed it as a diseased excrescence to be discarded for the good of his own health. Therefore, 
endowing Moore with a property interest in the tissue once it was excised made little sense. 
But oocyte donors, quite to the contrary, do conceive of their oocytes as valuable commodities 
from the very beginning. It is the commercial value attached to the oocyte that leads many 
women to donate in the first place. This differs markedly from the Moore scenario and may 
therefore warrant disparate legal treatment. But still, numerous other legal lines speak against a 
strict property right in the body, even in commercial contexts. Surrogacy contracts in which 
women receive money in exchange for binding relinquishment of parental rights are void in 
many jurisdictions. See infra note 125. Further, state and federal laws prohibit compensation in 
exchange for transplantable human organs. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000); Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act § 10(a) (1987). 
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technically apply to oocytes, that is not the end of the analysis. Ac-
knowledging the limitations of the current statutory environment, 
the question of whether policy considerations counsel for or against 
extending the commodification ban to oocytes must be addressed. 
Surveying and critiquing the major policy considerations underlying 
the ban on the sale of organs, and considering their validity in the 
oocyte context, is an appropriate place to start. 
B. Policy Rationales for the Legal Ban on the Sale of Transplant 
Organs 
1. Commodification of the human body belittles the human existence 
It is argued that the blatant commodification of the human body 
inherent in a market-driven system of organ allocation belittles the 
human existence.87 According to this argument, it is morally and 
ethically suspect to treat derivatives of the body like any other 
good.88 The human body is to be cherished, not set afloat in the 
mechanistic stream of commerce. While it may be acceptable and 
even appropriate to reimburse donors for their inconvenience and 
costs incurred in donation, remuneration over and above the amount 
needed to make the donor whole again is objectionable. When this 
happens, financial motivations become an incentive to donate, blur-




 87. Margaret Jane Radin, an outspoken opponent of the universal commodification of 
the human body, has argued that “the characteristic rhetoric of economic analysis is morally 
wrong when it is put forward as the sole discourse of human life.” Margaret Jane Radin, Mar-
ket-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (1987). She further argues that “[t]o speak 
of personal attributes as fungible objects—alienable ‘goods’—is intuitively wrong.” Id. at 
1880. See also THOMAS H. MURRAY, THE WORTH OF A CHILD (1996); MARGARET JANE 
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996). 
 88. Professor Radin differentiates goods that are appropriate for commodification from 
goods, such as the human body and its derivatives, that are inappropriate for commodification 
because the latter are irrevocably intertwined with our concepts of personhood so that com-
modifying them would alter our existence to one of chattelry. This re-definition of the body 
and individuals themselves would therefore hinder what Radin refers to as “human flourishing” 
by replacing interpersonal relationships with emotionless market associations. It is her opinion 
that “[s]ystematically conceiving of personal attributes as fungible objects is threatening to per-
sonhood, because it detaches from the person that which is integral to the person. . . . Market 
rhetoric, the rhetoric of alienability of all ‘goods,’ is also the rhetoric of alienation of ourselves 
from what we can be as persons.” Radin, supra note 87, at 1881, 1884–85. 
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person and property.89 The market is driven by efficiency, not moral-
ity, and is therefore irreconcilable with integral, non-efficiency-based 
aspects of human existence. For these reasons, the sale of organs 
guarantees to undermine the expressive aspects of the human body 
and human existence. 
But this argument proves too much. Its basic premise—that soci-
ety should not foster or even condone the commodification of the 
human being—is itself irreconcilable with reality. The fact is that we 
live in a market economy. Competition and commodification are 
cornerstone economic philosophies to which we subject the entire 
population every day, in numerous ways. 
Intelligence is the best skill to possess in our labor markets. Pro-
fessionals, such as doctors, lawyers, and businesspersons are paid 
handsomely for the use of their intellect. Sharp intellect equals pres-
tigious education, which in turn leads to a well-paying job. Enter-
tainers are paid for their personality, good (or at least interesting) 
looks, and wit. Athletes are paid for their athletic prowess. Research 
subjects are paid for “volunteering” their bodies for scientific ex-
perimentation and advancement. Genetic sequences are patented, 
just like any other product, leading to multi-billion dollar industries. 
Damages in personal injury cases derive from standardized charts 
that place values on various body parts. And if one is looking for un-
equivocal evidence of society’s commodification of the physical 
body, one need look no further than the latest issue of GQ or 
Vogue. The fashion and modeling industries are founded on the re-
ality that beauty sells. Just ask Ron Harris. 
To argue that the commodification of individual attributes, even 
physical attributes, is antithetical to our conception of personhood or 
human flourishing is to indict our entire way of life. In reality, the 
majority of wealth in this world is distributed along lines of human 
capital. Our bodies and our abilities are the most valuable commodi-
 
 89. Again, quoting Radin: 
In our understanding of personhood we are committed to an ideal of individual 
uniqueness that does not cohere with the idea that each person’s attributes are fun-
gible, that they have a monetary equivalent, and that they can be traded off against 
those of other people. Universal market rhetoric transforms our world of concrete 
persons, whose uniqueness and individuality is expressed in specific personal attrib-
utes, into a world of disembodied, fungible, attribute-less entities possessing a 
wealth of alienable, severable “objects.” This rhetoric reduces the conception of a 
person to an abstract, fungible unit with no individuating characteristics. 
Id. at 1885. 
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ties we possess. Of course, this reality does not preclude one from 
mounting a coherent and convincing Marxian argument that all 
forms of human commodification are inappropriate. But faced with 
the pervasiveness and nearly unanimous acceptance of such com-
modification across so many realms, it seems entirely arbitrary to 
draw the line at organs. How is selling one’s kidney any more injuri-
ous to our collective conception of personhood than selling one’s 
body for scientific experimentation? 
Of course, even if there is some inherent moral weight to consis-
tency, it is not absolute. If unique circumstances surrounding organs 
or oocytes counsel against the presumption of consistency, then dif-
ferential treatment may be justified. But this argument against com-
modification of the body for the sake of preserving conceptions of 
personhood and human flourishing encounters further, not fewer, 
difficulties when applied to the specific context of oocyte donation. 
It cannot be denied that reproduction and child rearing are inte-
gral to our conceptions of personhood and human flourishing. For 
many, such practices are the ultimate goal and validation of their very 
existence. Therefore, in addition to the arbitrary line drawing, pro-
ponents of anti-commodification must overcome the inescapable 
consequence that they are denying many infertile individuals the abil-
ity to fully experience human flourishing as we understand it. This is 
so because the absence of markets for oocytes is likely to lead to a 
shortage of donors. As will be discussed in greater detail in the fol-
lowing section, the experience of countries that remove oocyte dona-
tion from market control, like England and Israel, is one of drastic 
shortage. Lacking sufficient financial incentives, potential donors are 
unwilling to subject themselves to the retrieval process, leaving thou-
sands of infertile couples on long waiting lists. There is no reason to 
believe that the American experience would be any different. 
Considering the criticisms and consequences of a strictly moral 
objection to the commodification of reproductive tissues, it becomes 
somewhat of a strawman. If any rational basis does exist for distin-
guishing organs and oocytes from the myriad other socially con-
doned commodifications of the human body, it must lie elsewhere. 
2. Commodification will undermine the altruistic and communitarian 
motivations that currently underlie charitable donations 
It has been argued, primarily in the context of blood donation, 
that providing financial remuneration to donors would result in a de-
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crease in the number of charitable donations. In his book The Gift 
Relationship, Roger Titmuss suggested that paid blood donation 
would undermine the altruistic motivations that lead individuals to 
donate their blood for free.90 By paying for such donations, society 
would implicitly devalue the meaning of charitable donations by in-
appropriately putting a price tag on them.91 Individuals who would 
have otherwise donated their blood for free would be persuaded by 
self-interest to ask for the compensation they now thought they de-
served. The intrinsic, altruistic reward would be displaced by the ex-
trinsic, self-interested lure of financial compensation. 
Whether or not such a shift would lead to an overall increase or 
decrease in donations is arguable and likely depends on the amount 
of compensation provided. But Titmuss was concerned with more 
than just decreasing numbers of blood donors. He was also con-
cerned with the broader social implications that such a shift would 
endorse. Moving from a blood donation system based on altruism to 
a system based on compensation would lead society further away 
from communitarian, collectivist attitudes and conceptions and more 
towards the self-interested, individualist existence that Titmuss 
feared. For him, a charitable system of blood donation exemplified 
and reinforced the sense of community that was appropriate and 
necessary for our continued existence and prosperity. 
Variations of the same argument can be made in the context of 
oocyte donation. Such arguments typically posit that the introduc-
tion of financial compensation into the oocyte donation process will 
both inappropriately alter the meaning of donation and lead to a re-
duction in charitable donations. However, there are difficulties with 
this analysis, and they apply with equal force to blood and oocytes. 
 
 
 90. RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO 
SOCIAL POLICY (1971). 
 91. As Titmuss states: 
Where are the lines to be drawn—can indeed any lines at all be pragmatically 
drawn—if human blood be legitimated as a consumption good? To search for an 
identity and sphere of concern for social policy would thus be to search for the non-
existent. All policy would become in the end economic policy and the only values 
that would count are those that can be measured in terms of money and pursued in 
the dialectic of hedonism. Each individual would act egoistically for the good of all 
by selling his blood for what the market would pay. To abolish the moral choice of 
giving to strangers could lead to an ideology to end all ideologies. 
Id. at 12. 
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With regard to blood donations, the status of our nation’s blood 
reserves has undergone change since Titmuss’ book—change that 
requires a reevaluation of Titmuss’ contentions.92 Originally, blood 
donation was compensated. However, when the Red Cross began 
soliciting the charitable donation of blood, it was thought that de-
mand could be adequately met without resorting to financial in-
ducements. Although paid collections continued to exist, they were 
significantly outpaced by the Red Cross’s charitable donation ser-
vice.93 At the time that Titmuss wrote his book, charitable donations 
were generally sufficient to satisfy demand, and there was occasion-
ally an annual surplus.94 It was from this perspective of excess that 
Titmuss made his argument against compensation for blood dona-
tion. 
Since then, however, trends in blood donation have shifted. 
Charitable donations have declined, resulting in a shortage of 
blood.95 Reserves are shrinking, and demand now outpaces supply.96 
This new reality requires us to view the charitable versus compen-
sated donation debate from a different perspective than Titmuss did 
in 1970. Unlike then, we no longer have the luxury of assuming that 
charitable donations will be sufficient to meet society’s need for 
blood. 
So what does this mean for the Titmuss argument? On an ana-
lytical level, it is hard to say. The fact that charitable donations have 
declined could be seen as support for his central thesis. It is possible 
that the existence of a compensated system of blood donation even-
 
 92. For an in-depth history of blood donation practices and legislation, see SCOTT, su-
pra note 68, at 190–96. 
 93. See id. 
 94. For instance, in 1967, over 6.6 million units of whole blood were collected, while 
only 4.3 million units were transfused. TITMUSS, supra note 90, at 58. 
 95. See, e.g., Jonathan Curiel, Call for Blood Donations in ‘Very Critical’ Situation, S.F. 
CHRON., Jan. 5, 2000, at A13; Irene Garcia, Blood Shortage Prompts Sherman, Others To Roll 
Up Sleeves; Health: Attributed in Part to Flu Outbreak, Deficiency Is Said To Be the Worst in 
More Than Two Decades, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2000, at B2; Jacqueline L. Salmon, Search for 
Blood Donations, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2000, at V03; Saturday Early Show: Nation’s Blood 
Supply Reaching Critically Low Levels (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 15, 2000); CNN Your 
Health: Government Warns of a Blood Shortage (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 23, 1999). 
 96. See, e.g., Dire Blood Shortage, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 13, 1999, at A24 (noting that 
“Californians needed an estimated 1.1 million pints of blood this year but only 898,000 pints 
were collected by the state’s blood banks”); Jacqueline L. Salmon, Donors Needed as Area Re-
ports Blood Shortages, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2000, at V03 (noting that blood donations in the 
Washington, D.C. area are not keeping pace with demand). 
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tually led to a devaluation of altruism and ultimately undermined 
communitarian values, just as Titmuss proposed. On the other hand, 
the decline in charitable donations could have been due to some fac-
tor other than a compensation-induced paradigmatic shift towards 
self-interested values and behavior. Without well-controlled and de-
tailed longitudinal studies of societal values and attitudes towards 
blood donation, it is impossible to tell. 
But this analytical debate is merely peripheral. What is of central 
importance and concern is the practical effect of the decline in chari-
table donations and the consequent shortage with which we are now 
faced. From our current position of shortage, knowing that we can-
not rely on charitable donations to meet our blood demands, what is 
the appropriate moral stance to take? Do we, in the name of altruism 
and communitarian values, ban compensation for blood donations 
and thereby likely worsen the shortage? Or, for the sake of maintain-
ing our blood supplies and minimizing the number of people who 
must go without, do we offer adequate compensation to entice suffi-
cient donations? 
The same moral question can be asked in the context of oocyte 
donations. As noted earlier, and as expanded upon in Part V, coun-
tries that prohibit oocyte donor compensation find themselves facing 
severe donor shortages, resulting in waiting lists of several years. 
These shortages preclude couples from exercising their procreative 
liberty and realizing their reproductive desires. The United States, by 
contrast, with its currently unregulated, market-driven system of oo-
cyte donation, has a donor pool that adequately meets demand.97 As-
suming that procreative liberty is a right worth protecting, then what 
is the appropriate path to take? Do we deprive couples from exercis-
ing that liberty in the name of altruism and communitarian values, or 
do we allow for sufficient compensation to guarantee a stable source 
of oocytes? 
In an ideal world, charitable donations, whether of blood or oo-
cytes or any other valuable resource, would prove sufficient to meet 
societal needs. And in such an ideal world, a strong argument could 
be made that the prohibition of compensation for the donation of 
such resources is the appropriate moral stance. Under these condi-
 
 97. The long lists of available donors at each clinic and website that are ready and will-
ing to begin the protocol evidence this fact. Accordingly, there is no data relating to the aver-
age waiting time for recipient couples in the United States. 
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tions, reinforcement of communitarian values would have no adverse 
effect on supply. But this is not the ideal world, and, as the domestic 
blood shortage and foreign oocyte shortages illustrate, we cannot 
rely on charitable donations to provide adequate supplies. Therefore, 
the reinforcement of communitarian values is now at odds with the 
maintenance of adequate supplies of blood or oocytes, and we are 
faced with a dilemma that did not plague Titmuss: Which is more 
important, reinforcing charitable, communitarian values or minimiz-
ing the number of individuals who must go without blood or oo-
cytes? Under such circumstances, the fostering of altruistic ideals 
should not trump compensation-induced increases in supply. We de-
feat the ideal of altruism when its direct consequence is harm to oth-
ers. 
Furthermore, Titmuss was concerned that financial incentives 
would jeopardize the quality of the donated blood.98 Because of the 
lure of money, poor individuals harboring infectious diseases would 
have reason not to disclose their medical history and donate blood 
that could harm or even kill its recipient. But again, we must re-
evaluate Titmuss’ argument in the light of present day. 
The transmission of infectious diseases through tissue or blood is 
no longer a major threat. We have extremely accurate screening 
techniques for the major blood-borne infectious diseases, eliminating 
that concern. In addition, specific to the oocyte context, quality as-
surances are built into the selection process. Unlike blood donors, 
oocyte donors are carefully screened through histories, physicals, and 
diagnostic and genetic testing. Recipients choose their donors on the 
bases of health and fitness. Therefore, quality is much less of a con-
cern, even if oocyte donors donate for financial reasons. 
Because of these practical and technical constraints on an exclu-
sively charitable system of oocyte donation, this line of argument ap-
pears insufficient to sustain a ban on the commodification of oocyte 
donation, just as it failed to sustain a ban on the commodification of 
blood donation in this country. 
 
 
 98. TITMUSS, supra note 90, at 76 (“As a market transaction, information that might 
have a bearing on the quality of the blood is withheld if possible from the buyer; such informa-
tion could be detrimental to the price or the sale.”). 
2BAU-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  8:29 PM 
107] Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation 
 141 
3. Markets in body parts can and do lead to coercion, theft, and murder 
Another rationale offered for the current ban on the sale of 
transplant organs is that the creation of markets in body parts will 
generate dangerous incentives for abuse.99 The existence of such a 
market would transform organs into extremely valuable commodi-
ties. First, the market would quickly lead to stabilization of the 
monetary values associated with organs, i.e., the creation of a market 
price. With price stabilization comes the reliable assurance that any 
particular organ can be sold for a specific value. Such assurances 
would make the sale of organs more desirable than a system under 
which the compensation received was uncertain. Second, a market 
would provide liquidity in organs. A structured market centralizes 
transactions: it brings sellers and buyers together. Consequently, 
someone who has an organ to sell does not have to worry about 
finding someone to buy it. Again, such assurances would make the 
sale of organs more reliable, and hence more desirable. This combi-
nation of price stabilization and liquidity would therefore facilitate 
and provide incentives for the sale of organs for valuable considera-
tion.100 
Assuming that this proposed market influence is accurate, what is 
wrong with creating incentives for transactions in transplant organs? 
The argument is that once a stable market exists in which to sell 
high-priced organs, individuals desperate for money will either co-
 
 99. See, e.g., ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW 67 (1997) (“I assume that treating organs as 
commodities would indeed increase the supplies available for transplantation, but I express no 
opinion on whether this would come about primarily through benign incentives for voluntary 
transfers or, instead, through the murder and dismemberment of the powerless, though my 
instincts run to the latter rather than the former.”); SCOTT, supra note 68, at 183 (noting that 
“[m]any people disapprove of the sale of human body parts on the ground that it is . . . filled 
with possibilities of abuse, ranging from the exploitation of children and other helpless people 
to encouragement to murder”). 
 100. To illustrate this market effect, imagine that you are urgently in need of $20,000, 
for whatever reason. You own two cars, and you consider selling one of them to obtain the 
money. You know that car A is worth $20,000 because it is bought and sold all the time, and 
there are numerous advertisements from buyers and sellers in the newspaper. However, there 
are no advertisements from sellers or purchasers of car B. You have no idea how much it is 
worth or if you could even find an interested buyer. Which car are you more likely to sell? Now 
imagine the reverse scenario. You have $20,000 with which to buy a car, and you are consider-
ing two different models. One is commonly bought and sold, so you have a good idea how 
much it is worth and know that you can easily find a seller. The other is not commonly bought 
or sold, resulting in uncertainty of value and availability. Which car are you more likely to buy? 
The point is, when a market exists in a certain good, there is much more of an incentive for 
both buyers and sellers to transact. 
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erce others to sell their organs or will steal organs for profit.101 
Hence, a market in organs will constitute a danger for all by effec-
tively placing price tags on our bodies.102 There are, however, several 
reasons why such concerns may miss the mark. 
First, there is little reason to assume that similar dangers are not 
equally prevalent in the absence of an established, publicly endorsed 
market in human organs. Thieves, murderers, and coercive individu-
als are not likely to be dissuaded merely by the lack of a legitimate 
organ market. As long as a black market exists, the financial incentive 
to obtain organs exists. In fact, such concerns have already been 
borne out in several countries, where defenseless individuals, both 
living and dead, have been harvested for organs that were then sold 
on the black market.103 Urban legend posits similar atrocities in the 
United States,104 but, thankfully, there have been no verified cases 
 
 101. The dangers are different, but of similar nature, for living and dead donors. For liv-
ing donors, the fear is that family members or acquaintances will coerce the donor into “donat-
ing” an organ out of financial necessity or greed. It is also possible that individuals could mur-
der for this money. For dying donors, the fear is that financial motives of family members or 
physicians could inappropriately influence decisions to withdraw or withhold life-saving care. 
For dead sources, the concern is that doctors and hospitals might harvest organs without con-
sent. 
 102. Again, using the automobile analogy, which are you more tempted to steal—a 
popularly traded car with a $20,000 price tag on it or a car of unknown value that is not com-
monly traded? 
 103. See, e.g., Lance Laytner, The Organ Trade: The Illegal Selling of Body Parts for Trans-
plants Is Big International Business, IRISH TIMES, July 5, 1999, at 10 (chronicling the arrest of 
two Chinese men in New York when they attempted to sell human organs harvested from exe-
cuted Chinese prisoners to undercover FBI agents); Organ Thefts Investigated, HOUSTON 
CHRON., Sept. 18, 1999, at 25A (reporting that Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit was 
instigating a probe into reports that groups were cutting open bodies of people killed in the 
August 1999 earthquake to illegally harvest their organs); Orphanage Accused of Organ Theft, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 20, 1999, at A5 (reporting that Egyptian authorities were investigating 
Parliamentary allegations that an orphanage sold the organs of some of its children to hospitals 
that cater to wealthy Arabs, resulting in the death of a number of children); CNN Saturday: 
International Authorities Investigate Human Organ Market (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 
13, 1999) (discussing the founding of Organ Watch, a Berkeley, California based group that 
tracks the international organ market, watching for human rights abuses). 
 104. Many have heard of “the friend of a friend” who woke up in a bathtub full of ice, 
having been drugged and had his kidney removed. However, there have been no verified inci-
dents of this nature, and such stories are believed to be merely myths. See, e.g., Jill Burcum, 
Health Rumor Reality Check, MINN. STAR TRIB., Apr. 4, 2000, at 1E (dispelling a number of 
domestic health rumors, including “The Kidney Heist” myth); Benjamin Radford, Bitter Har-
vest: The Organ-Snatching Urban Legends, 23 SKEPTICAL INQUIRER 34 (1999) (dispelling do-
mestic myths of organ theft); Angela Shah, Somebody Stole My Kidney! (and Other Urban Leg-
ends), AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 11, 1999, at D1 (uncovering the falsehoods behind 
various rumors of kidney theft in the United States). 
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yet. It appears then that the threat of abuse is somewhat independent 
of an established market in organs. 
Second, it is quite possible that the development of a stable mar-
ket in organs would mitigate, rather than facilitate, opportunities for 
abuse. Like a monopolist, sellers in a black market benefit from the 
absence of buyers’ alternatives. With nowhere else to turn, buyers are 
held hostage by the demands of the only available supplier. This 
power dynamic allows those “who have” to force unilaterally benefi-
cial terms on those “who need.” Two characteristics specific to the 
transplant context further undermine buyer empowerment: the ur-
gency inherent in the need for a life-saving organ transplant and the 
drastic shortage of transplant organs in this country.105 Both of these 
realities serve to increase the sense of desperation on the part of buy-
ers, making them even more susceptible to supplier coercion. 
But with a market comes competition. And with competition 
comes choice, which leads to a shift in buyer-seller power dynamics. 
Illegitimate suppliers are no longer able to extort inflated prices from 
desperate buyers, and no longer enjoy the luxury of knowing that 
they can find a willing buyer at all, due to the presence of competing 
suppliers. Thus, the creation of a market could actually lead to disin-
centives for abuse. 
Third, to continue the use of market rhetoric, organs are not en-
tirely fungible goods, whether or not a market exists. Due to physi-
cal106 and immunologic107 constraints, particular organs are of value 
 
 105. As of 2000, the number of patients on organ transplant waiting lists had grown to 
72,582. United Network for Organ Sharing, Critical Data: U.S. Facts About Transplantation 
(visited Oct. 30, 2000) <http://www.unos.org/Newsroom/cridata_main.htm>. To put this 
growth into perspective, the current list is more than twice as large as it was at the end of 
1993—33,394—and approximately four times its size at the end of 1988—16,026. United 
Network for Organ Sharing, Waiting List (visited Oct. 30, 2000) <http://www.unos.org/ 
Newsroom/cridata_wait.htm>. And these numbers reflect only those who are already on the 
waiting lists. In reality, there are many more in need of organ transplantation who are not yet 
registered. The reason that the waiting list continues to grow year after year is because dona-
tion rates, despite their consistent increases, are failing to meet the demand. During the same 
time period noted above, the number of organ donors increased as well but not at nearly the 
same rate. In 1988, there were 5,907 total organ donations. United Network for Organ Shar-
ing, Donors (visited Oct. 30, 1999) <http://www.unos.org/Newsroom/cridata_wait.htm>. In 
1993, this number had climbed to 7,766, and in 1998, it had grown to 10,073. Id. This 68% 
increase sounds impressive, but it is dwarfed by the concurrent 300% increase in the total size 
of the waiting list. 
 106. Physically, organ donors and recipients must be of similar size in order for the organ 
to fit in the appropriate space. Therefore, adult organs are usually too big for pediatric recipi-
ents. 
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only to particular recipients. Therefore, extensive matching analyses 
are necessary prior to any donation. In addition, donors must un-
dergo medical histories and exams to assure their suitability as do-
nors.108 This means that the source of the organ must be verified at 
the outset. The need for such identification and documentation 
serves as an intrinsic protection against unconsented, anonymous 
transactions. 
The proposition that the establishment of a market in organs 
would lead to increases in abuse is therefore highly speculative. But 
even assuming the validity of that assertion, there is ample reason to 
believe that the same concerns are not relevant to the oocyte con-
text. 
First, due to the technical realities of oocyte harvesting high-
lighted in Part II, oocytes are not as susceptible to theft as transplant 
organs. One cannot just abduct a woman and steal her oocytes. It 
requires a month-long series of hyperstimulation injections just to 
reach the point of accessibility, and, even then, only a short window 
of opportunity exists for harvesting oocytes. Therefore, unless society 
is worried that women will be kidnapped, restrained for a month, 
and subjected to ovarian hyperstimulation, and then harvested for 
oocytes, there is little cause for concern. The fact that we currently 
have a free market in oocyte donation and there have yet to be any 
claims or documentation of oocyte theft should, at the very least, be 
comforting. And if we really are concerned about such abuses, why 
are we comfortable with women undergoing IVF at all? The poten-
 
 107. Organ donors and recipients must also match immunologically. As an eminent text-
book on the subject notes, “The immune system has evolved elaborate and effective mecha-
nisms to protect the organism from attack by foreign agents, and these same mechanisms cause 
rejection of grafts from any other individual except one who is genetically identical to the re-
cipient.” RICHARD A. GOLDSBY ET AL., IMMUNOLOGY 517 (4th ed. 2000). Essentially, the 
success of organ transplants depends heavily on the degree of matching of specific genes be-
tween the donor and the recipient. The products of these genes are proteins that regulate the 
immune response to the presence of foreign tissues. The more similar the profile between do-
nor and recipient, the less intensely the recipient’s immune system attacks the newly trans-
planted organ. Therefore, identity is everything in organ transplantation, such that all donors 
and recipients must undergo extensive genetic testing prior to transplantation. This process is 
called “matching.” For an excellent review of transplant immunology, see id. 517–35. 
 108. Solid organs can harbor infectious diseases and even undetected cancers, which can 
then be transmitted to the organ recipient. Therefore, donors must undergo the appropriate 
medical screening tests before qualifying as a viable donor. Both state legislatures and the in-
dustry itself impose such requirements. For examples of state statutes necessitating donor 
screening, see supra note 44. For typical industry guidelines, see Screening Criteria (visited 
Dec. 2, 2000) <http://www.fertilityoptions.com/html_pub/guid_sc.htm>. 
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tial for theft and murder is exactly the same for a woman undergoing 
ovarian stimulation for her own IVF cycle as for a woman undergo-
ing ovarian stimulation for oocyte donation. But no one is calling for 
a ban on IVF in the name of safety. Clearly, then, any line drawing 
must be based on some other concern. 
Second, the life-or-death urgency faced by those in need of 
transplant organs is not present in the oocyte context. A person will 
die immediately without a life-saving organ.109 However, without an 
oocyte, no similar irreversible line is crossed. True, infertility remains, 
but it can be resolved just as well a month later. This reduced sense 
of urgency makes resort to desperate measures, such as theft and 
murder, less likely. 
Third, as in the transplant organ context, the need for donor 
identification and documentation serves as an intrinsic protection 
against unconsented, anonymous oocyte transactions. The basic 
premise of a market in oocytes is that all oocytes are not of compara-
ble worth. Some oocytes are more valuable than others, and this 
value derives from the identity of the source. At the most basic level, 
oocytes carrying particular genetic diseases are virtually worthless for 
donation.110 But further distinctions are drawn depending on the so-
cial and personal desirability of particular genetic characteristics. For 
instance, recall the couple introduced in Part I. For them, an oocyte 
from a donor with particular intellectual, physical, and athletic char-
acteristics was worth substantially more than an oocyte chosen at 
random from a group of medically appropriate donors. The point is 
that the value of a particular oocyte in a market depends entirely on 
the identity of the source, such that anonymous donor oocytes are of 
little value. Therefore, there is no room for theft, unless the thief re-
veals and guarantees the identity of the source. But by doing that, 
the thief would all but seal his or her conviction. Fourth, for the rea-
sons noted above, it could again be argued that the existence of an 
established market would decrease, not increase, the incentives for 
abuse. 
 
 109. Kidneys, of course, do not fall into this category of “life-saving organs,” due to the 
presence of dialysis. 
 110. No individual wants to select an oocyte that harbors a genetic disease, because that 
disease could then be transmitted to the offspring. Therefore, oocytes that harbor serious dis-
eases, such as Huntington’s chorea, Tay-Sachs disease, or sickle-cell anemia are of no value at 
all for oocyte donation. For this reason, the identity and genetic profile of the oocyte donor are 
paramount. 
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In the end, it is difficult to say with certainty whether or not a 
significant possibility for abuse inheres in a free market for oocytes, 
over and above the dangers presented by the alternative black mar-
ket. This being the case, such concerns seem to be an insufficient jus-
tification for depriving individuals both of procreative liberty and the 
right to make freely what is not clearly an unreasonable or irrational 
decision—to donate their oocytes for partially or even purely finan-
cial reasons. 
4. Free alienability of organs will have a discriminatory impact on both 
donors and recipients 
A fourth argument central to the organ commodification debate 
focuses on the disparate effects that subjecting life-saving resources 
to market control will have on differing socioeconomic groups. The 
general proposition is that a system of free alienability would favor 
those who have financial resources at the expense of those who do 
not.111 On the demand side of the equation, only those who could 
afford to pay the market price would receive the organs, effectively 
precluding access to the poor. On the supply side, due to the declin-
ing marginal utility of money,112 donor compensation would create 
disproportionately greater incentives for poor individuals to donate  
 
 
 111. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 21, at 225 (noting that “the distribution of wealth 
operates as a prime determinant of who exercises reproductive rights”). Professor Robertson 
goes on to explain that 
[c]lass and money may also influence the roles individuals play in the collaborative 
reproductive process. . . . Since donors and surrogates are usually paid for their con-
tribution, the danger is that only the middle class and wealthy will have the re-
sources to hire them, while only the lower classes will be inclined to assume these 
roles. If this is so, money and class will greatly skew the distribution of roles and ser-
vices in collaborative reproduction. 
Id. at 226. See also TED PETERS, FOR THE LOVE OF CHILDREN: GENETIC TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 68–69 (1996); SCOTT, supra note 68, at 183 (noting that 
“[s]ome critics claim that, under free enterprise, only the poor will sell body parts and only the 
affluent will be able to buy them, so that the possibility of buying a body or burying one intact 
could become a luxury available only to the wealthy”). 
 112. The concept of “declining marginal utility of money” refers to the fact that the 
more money one has, the less an additional dollar is worth to that person because it only mi-
nutely increases overall wealth. For example, imagine that person A has $1,000,000 dollars, 
and person B has $1,000. Due to the declining marginal utility of money, an additional $1,000 
is worth less to A than B. For A, that additional money only increases net worth by 0.001%. 
However, that same money would increase B’s net worth by a full 100%. 
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than wealthy individuals.113 This would lead to a situation in which 
the poor served as paid organ reservoirs for the wealthy.114 Distribu-
tion according to wealth thereby promises to discriminate against 
poor populations, both as organ donors and recipients. 
Even if this simplistic economic analysis were true, and there are 
reasons to doubt that it is,115 it is far from clear that it closes the door 
on the commodification position. 
a. Demand side. Focusing first on the demand side, equality of 
resource distribution across socioeconomic levels is certainly not a 
general guiding principle in our society (or any market economy for 
that matter). If it were, we would tolerate no expensive commodities 
that only some could afford. But this is clearly not the case, as almost 
any example will illustrate. Consider the Rolls Royce. Luxury, pres-
tige, and comfort at its finest. Accessible only to the lucky few but 
tolerated nonetheless because the existence of the Rolls Royce does 
not preclude the less wealthy from buying a Honda, a Saturn, a bicy-
cle, or taking the bus. We generally tolerate that only the wealthy 
can afford access to the best, as long as there exist reasonable alterna-
tives—albeit lower quality alternatives—for the rest. If there is any 
force behind the discriminatory organ distribution argument then, it 
must be because organs are distinguishable from other goods in 
some relevant respect. 
Are organs different? They are arguably different because their 
distribution impacts much more than just creature comforts. Indeed, 
the distribution of organs directly determines who may live and who 
may die. There can be no graver consequence than this, and maybe 
that is why organs deserve preferential treatment. Perhaps life or 
 
 113. For organs such as the heart and pancreas that are necessary for life, the monetary 
incentives of donation would fall on the family members, not the potential donor himself, be-
cause the donor would obviously no longer be living. But this arguably changes little, as fami-
lies are likely to be in the same socioeconomic class as the potential donor and will hence face 
the same incentives. 
 114. See ROBERTSON, supra note 21, at 227 (“Carried to extremes, a breeder class of 
poor, minority women whose reproductive capacity is exploited by wealthier people could 
emerge.”). 
 115. First, such a conclusion assumes that the costs of obtaining organs would fall on the 
patient. However, it is possible that insurance companies would shoulder such costs. This may 
still not solve the discrimination problem, because many of the nation’s poorest groups lack 
insurance and would hence still be left out in the cold—unless universal health care eventually 
becomes a reality. Second, by turning the organ market loose, there may be enough incentive 
to donate that supply would meet and even exceed demand, thereby driving down costs to 
manageable levels, such that all could afford. 
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death decisions should not turn on a criterion such as wealth. It 
could be that the application of such a criterion in this context is in-
appropriate because it articulates the unambiguous message that so-
ciety categorically values the lives of one group (the wealthy) more 
than the lives of another group (the poor). In the end, it is nothing 
more than another form of the “social worth” criteria that were 
originally employed to determine the distribution of scarce chronic 
dialysis resources.116 Such criteria were universally condemned as fail-
ing to make morally relevant distinctions and acknowledge the simi-
lar value of all individual lives. Maybe a market in transplant organs 
sends the same message and should therefore be banned. 
But even if this argument was correct, it loses its significance 
when translated into the oocyte context. What makes the organ con-
text unique—what differentiates it from oocytes—is the life-or-death, 
all-or-nothing nature of organ allocation. Because people will die 
without life-saving transplants, and because there are not enough or-
gans available to save everyone, no matter how we allocate organs, 
some people are effectively left for dead.117 Every person who re-
 
 116. In the early 1960s, Dr. Belding H. Scribner, a nephrologist on the faculty of the 
University of Washington School of Medicine, established the first chronic dialysis center to 
treat individuals with end-stage renal disease. Unfortunately, the center could only accommo-
date nine beds. Because demand far outstripped this capacity, the center had to decide who to 
treat and who to exclude. In order to make these difficult decisions, two committees were es-
tablished. The Medical Advisory Committee, composed of physicians, selected patients who 
were medically and psychiatrically suitable. The Admissions and Policy Committee, composed 
of seven anonymous community members from various backgrounds, then chose which of the 
pre-qualified candidates would receive the dialysis treatment. Instead of using strict and ab-
stract selection criteria, the committee undertook a case-by-case analysis of each applicant, con-
sidering extensive personal, social, psychological, and economic factors (such as age, gender, 
marital status, number of dependents, income, educational background, occupation, past per-
formance, and future potential). For several years, the committee used these “social worth cri-
teria” to decide who would receive the treatment. When word of this selection process spread, 
public outcry brought it to an end. See ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE ETHICS OF ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION AND ARTIFICIAL ORGANS 211–14 (1999). See also RENÉE C. FOX & 
JUDITH P. SWAZEY, THE COURAGE TO FAIL: A SOCIAL VIEW OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND 
DIALYSIS (1974) (providing a vivid and complete portrayal of the committee). 
 117. As a result of the growing gap between the supply and demand of life-saving trans-
plant organs, the number of individuals who die while awaiting transplant continues to grow. 
In 1988, 1,494 individuals lost their lives while on the waiting lists. United Network for Organ 
Sharing, Waiting List: Number of Patients Removed from the OPTN Waiting List Due to Death 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2000) <http://www.unos.org/frame_Default.asp?Category=News-
data.htm>. By 1993, that number had risen to 2,883. See id. And by 1998, despite the fact 
that nearly 22,000 transplants were performed, the number of deaths while waiting had 
reached 4,855. See id. Currently, approximately 14 people die every day waiting for a trans-
plant. See id. 
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ceives an organ diminishes the chance that some other person will 
receive an organ and thereby increases the chance that someone else 
will die. Only in the context of kidney disease, where it is possible to 
keep a person alive with dialysis, is there a viable alternative to trans-
plantation. But in the majority of transplant cases, there are no long-
term options, either of comparable or lesser quality: you either re-
ceive an organ, or you die. There is no middle ground. There is no 
less expensive, lower quality substitute. Therefore, allocation of or-
gans along lines of wealth results not in a distribution where the 
wealthy get the best and the poor get the rest but a distribution 
where the wealthy get life and the poor get death. It is this lack of a 
cheaper, alternative means for the poor to achieve the same ends as 
the wealthy—the all-or-nothing aspect of organ allocation—that 
makes market controlled distribution of life-saving transplant organs 
unconscionable. 
Oocytes do not share this critical characteristic of all-or-nothing, 
life-or-death concerns. To begin with, oocytes, unlike organs, are 
not scarce resources in this country, at least not currently. Presently, 
the supply of oocytes meets their demand, such that one couple’s 
purchase of an oocyte does not decrease the chances that some other 
couple will find a donor. In addition, oocytes of varying value exist, 
such that “lower quality,” less expensive alternatives exist for those 
who cannot afford to pay $50,000 for the ideal donor. Even in the 
face of recent skyrocketing in donor compensation, most fertility 
agencies and individual donors continue to ask only a few thousand 
dollars for the provision of oocytes, enough to compensate the do-
nor for costs and inconveniences, but no more. True, this probably 
means that only the wealthy will have the luxury of hand-picking do-
nors with the most socially and personally desirable characteristics, 
but it does not foreclose those with fewer resources from achieving 
the same ends via less expensive means. Unlike organ allocation, oo-
cyte allocation offers options. Oocyte allocation is not an all-or-
nothing, life-or-death proposition, and that is the key distinction. 
Furthermore, there is a significant moral difference between say-
ing, “Sorry, we do not have enough of this vital resource to support 
us all, so unless you have enough money available, we are going to 
let you die,” and saying, “Sorry, only those who can afford it will re-
ceive the most valued reserves of this important, yet not scarce or vi-
tal, resource. The rest of you can still have access, but only to the 
lesser valued reserves.” The two statements express very different 
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ideas. The former, again, expresses the proposition that the lives of 
the poor are not worth as much to society as the lives of the wealthy. 
The latter expresses the proposition that the opportunities of the 
poor are not as expansive as the opportunities of the wealthy. One is 
an arbitrary, categorical devaluation of a diverse group of individuals, 
while the other is a sad, but true, tenet of a market economy. The 
right to procreative liberty is qualitatively different than the right to 
equal access to life saving transplant organs. 
The current supply surplus could change, of course, and proba-
bly would if donor compensation were banned as in other countries. 
And if this were the case, then allocation by wealth could preclude 
the poor from any access at all. But this is an argument for, not 
against, market-based compensation rates for oocyte donors. Ban-
ning compensation erases the wealth distinction, but forces us all 
into a situation of scarcity such that some are guaranteed not to have 
any access at all. Permitting compensation, on the other hand, does 
allow for more expansive options for the wealthy than the poor but 
at least provides access for all. 
There is no positive constitutional guarantee for the right to pro-
create, only a negative right,118 and this reality is consistent with the 
analysis above. Individuals should be free from governmental inter-
ference with procreative pursuits, and market-based donor compen-
sation achieves that goal by eliminating barriers to access that regu-
lated compensation would erect. But individuals do not have the 
right to positive governmental assistance in obtaining oocytes for 
procreative pursuits. Government should not obstruct procreation, 
but it is not required to make sure that it is available to all. 
 
 118. Numerous Supreme Court cases make reference to the right to procreate. See, e.g., 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (stating that “our law affords consti-
tutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation . . . . These matters, 
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices cen-
tral to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (stating that “[i]f the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free of unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (stating that 
“rights to conceive and raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential’ [and] ‘basic civil 
rights of man’”) (citations omitted) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) 
and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 
541 (1942) (stressing the importance of marriage and procreation as among “the basic civil 
rights of man” and asserting that “marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very exis-
tence and survival of the race”). 
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In reality, the costs of many, if not most, forms of assisted repro-
duction are already exclusionary. IVF costs several thousand dollars, 
and surrogacy can cost over $40,000.119 While commodification 
could potentially exacerbate this problem, it is incorrect to think that 
regulation of oocyte donor compensation would eliminate this real-
ity. The wealthy will always have more procreative liberty than the 
poor, unless we alter our constitutional understanding of the right to 
privacy and declare a positive right to procreative liberty. But for 
now, it appears that market-based compensation is entirely consistent 
with our conception of the right to procreation.120 
b. Supply side. Turning now to the supply side of the equation, 
we again run into serious difficulties extending the discriminatory ef-
fect argument from the organ context to oocyte commodification. 
To refresh, the supply side of the argument holds that the possibility 
for financial remuneration will disproportionately attract poor indi-
viduals to donate organs. This will occur because the same amount 
of money will be valued more by people with scant financial re-
sources than by people with substantial holdings. Such a system will 
therefore result in a type of caste system where the poor serve as or-
gan repositories for the wealthy. 
Such an argument is without reason in either the organ or the 
oocyte context. First, the general trend in society is to allow indi-
viduals to take whatever risks they feel are justified by the compensa-
tion, even when those risks are much more serious and likely than 
those associated with oocyte donation.121 To rebut the presumption 
of acceptability then, there must be something different about trans 
plant organs or oocytes. Risks are risks, whether associated with or- 
 
 
 119. For example, Fertility Options estimates a cost of just under $45,000 for surrogacy 
recipients. Fee Schedules (visited Oct. 28, 2000) <http://www.fertilityoptions.com/html_pub/ 
guid_fa.htm>. 
 120. It is also consistent with our allocation of health care resources generally. We do not 
treat access to health care as a fundamental right, and our nation accordingly lacks a system of 
universal health care. Further, even if universal health care were the rule, it is not likely that the 
provision of oocytes for assisted reproduction would rise to the level of “basic health care” and 
would therefore still not create a positive right for infertile couples or an obligation for gov-
ernmental assistance. 
 121. See ROBERTSON, supra note 21, at 141 (“[M]arkets for the sale of gestational ser-
vices are no more exploitative than the sale of other kinds of physical labor. If people are free 
to sell their labor as petro-chemical workers, cleaning persons, or construction workers in the 
hot Texas sun, why should the sale of gestational services be treated any differently? Much paid 
labor is equally or even more risky to health.”). 
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gan removal, construction work, or oocyte donation. There is no 
reasoned way to draw this line. 
 Second, even if the concern is valid for the organ context, reali-
ties of oocyte donation again support disparate legal treatment. 
Wealthy people will happily accept organs from poor people because, 
provided that the donor passes the medical screening, an organ from 
a poor donor is worth just as much as an organ from a wealthy do-
nor. It is equally life saving. But wealthy infertile couples are playing 
a different, and rather elite, game. Most often, their goals are to find 
a donor whose physical and personal profile matches that of the in-
fertile woman or buy “designer genes.” University admission, how-
ever flawed that process may be, is a reasonable proxy for characteris-
tics like intelligence and athleticism, as well as intangibles like 
creativity and motivation. Just as people want their children to at-
tend these institutions, it follows that they also want oocytes—elite, 
promising oocytes—from students who attend these institutions. 
True, these universities are microcosms of society, and some students 
do come from poor and disadvantaged backgrounds. Perhaps they 
will feel more pressure to respond to the $50,000 advertisements 
that appear in college newspapers, but perhaps not. Women donate 
oocytes for a variety of reasons, some having to do with finances, 
some not. But the argument that poor populations, on the whole, 
are apt to be exploited is an unlikely scenario. That is not where in-
fertile couples are looking for potential donors. In any event, a sys-
tem where oocytes may be bought and sold for market value is much 
less likely to lead to the sort of caste system feared by opponents of 
compensated organ donation. It appears then that neither the de-
mand nor the supply side arguments justify a ban on the commodifi-
cation of oocytes. 
Surveying and analyzing the major arguments against the com-
modification of transplant organs leads to the conclusion that they 
are either internally untenable or inapplicable to oocyte donation. 
Therefore, in the following section, this article turns to look at ar-
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IV. ARGUMENTS SPECIFIC TO ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 
A. Arguments for Non-Commodification 
1. Allowing for the commodification of reproductive tissues, such as 
oocytes, will start us down the slippery slope to targeted genetic 
enhancement 
Much of the hesitation to expose reproductive tissues to the 
whims of the market stems from a fear of the potential for inappro-
priate applications and extensions. This consequentialist perspective 
maintains that, even if commodification is justified on grounds of 
procreative liberty, its potential application to targeted genetic en-
hancement, or eugenics, counsels against opening that door.122 Sim-
ply put, there is no reason to believe that society will use oocytes 
solely for the benefit of otherwise infertile couples. What is to stop 
fertile individuals from brokering for oocytes with desirable genetic 
characteristics in an attempt to produce some sort of “designer 
baby?” It is one thing for a couple to select a particular oocyte in or-
der to match the characteristics of the infertile woman but some-
thing entirely different for fertile couples to search out oocytes that 
will genetically enhance their offspring in some way. 
In order to critique this anti-commodification argument, we 
must deconstruct it further. Clearly, the presence or absence of a 
market in oocytes does not make or break the potential for targeted 
genetic enhancement. Even without a market, the opportunity exists 
for couples to seek out desirable oocyte donors in order to confer 
genetic advantages to their offspring. With or without a market, we 
already possess the technological capabilities. So what is it about the 
presence of a market in oocytes that makes this potential more likely? 
Perhaps the message sent by a socially condoned market in re-
productive tissues paves the way for eugenic pursuits. While societal 
norms and values certainly contribute to the form that legislation 
takes, the reverse is equally true: our laws inform and even help 
 
 122. Speaking in the context of direct genetic manipulation on the embryonic level, Pro-
fessor Robertson has noted that “[t]he main slippery slope fear is that parents will want genetic 
interventions not only to prevent severe defects, but to enhance offspring characteristics as 
well.” ROBERTSON, supra note 21, at 163. The same argument applies to oocyte donation. 
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shape our norms and values.123 This is not to argue for legal central-
ism. Clearly law is not the only, or maybe even the primary, source 
of norms and values in society. But the law certainly plays some role 
in shaping values. For example, consider the role of hate-crime legis-
lation. In addition to making hate-motivated abuses illegal, the pres-
ence of such legislation serves to reinforce an important social judg-
ment—that disparate treatment based on superficial characteristics, 
like race, gender, or sexual orientation, is unacceptable. The fact that 
we have democratically decided to punish crimes against “others” 
more severely than comparable abuses against “similars” informs us 
of the societal importance of this norm.124 
Maybe this is the source of anxiety that oocyte commodification 
conjures up for so many people. Legislation that allows for the free 
alienability of oocytes sends the message that it is socially acceptable 
to pick and choose among human characteristics for future genera-
tions. Once we are lulled into accepting that proposition, we have 
considerably weakened the moral barriers to full-blown eugenics. 
But again, this argument proves too much. First, if it is the selec-
tion of future human characteristics through genetic means that 
bothers our conscience, then how can we draw a distinction between 
selecting among uncompensated oocyte donors to match a couple’s 
genetic preferences and selecting among compensated oocyte donors 
for the same purpose? In either case, individuals are selecting human 
characteristics for future generations. Why does the provision of 
compensation make any ethical or moral difference? If it is the use of 
genetic preferences by parents in selecting their offspring’s gametic 
precursors that bothers us, then we should not tolerate either com-
pensated or uncompensated oocyte donation. The money should not 
matter. But instead, we have embraced uncompensated oocyte dona-
tion. 
Further, what should we make of the reality that we, both as 
humans and more generally as sexually reproductive creatures, have 
always selected our mates, and hence our offspring’s genetic under-
pinnings, based on observable indicators of fitness and genetics? Is 
this not the same thing? What about genetic screening of fetuses for 
 
 123. Scholars typically refer to this as the “expressive” aspect of law. See generally Dan M. 
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997); Dan M. 
Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998). 
 124. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 
460–64 (1999). 
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the purpose of elective abortion in the case of genetic anomaly? 
Again, this is not to argue for consistency merely for the sake of be-
ing consistent. There is no inherent moral weight in consistency. But 
there does not appear to be any relevant basis on which to distin-
guish compensated oocyte donation from any of the myriad other 
socially-condoned instances of gene-based reproductive selection. 
One could of course argue that the normative bite of this expres-
sive account lies in the bottom line; that is, as a society we abhor the 
association of genetic selection with money. Maybe at its base this is 
just an objection to what is perceived as “baby selling.” But in the 
end, this line of reasoning just devolves to the argument that com-
modification of the human body—or more specifically, parts of the 
human body that have the potential to create new life—belittles the 
human existence. This argument was already considered and dis-
missed in the previous section and is not repeated here.125 
Lastly, addressing the slippery slope argument more generally, 
such concerns fail to recognize the reality that selective oocyte dona-
tion represents only a small step, if a step at all, towards genetic en-
gineering. Selective oocyte donation is an extremely rudimentary and 
imprecise method of genetic engineering. As explained earlier, it re-
lies on gross simplifications and misconceptions of genetic inheri-
tance. Direct genetic manipulation, in which individual genes are de-
leted or inserted to match parental preferences, would certainly be 
the eugenic method of choice. Clearly, the road to eugenics does not  
 
 
 125. However, even if one does not accept the counter-arguments to these expressive 
concerns, the possibility for legislative resolution remains. If concerns regarding the message 
sent by socially sanctioned markets in oocytes lie at the heart of the opposition to commodifi-
cation, then a continued lack of positive legislation on the subject could present a compromise. 
Allowing individuals to buy and sell oocytes, but at the same time treating such transactions as 
unenforceable contracts, should resolve or at least mitigate expressive concerns. Like the legal 
treatment of surrogacy arrangements in many states, contracts regarding the sale of oocytes 
could be permitted but held void as against public policy. Parties would be free to enter into 
these arrangements, but they could not seek judicial enforcement in cases of dispute. There 
would be no legislative stamp of approval, and hence no expressive message. Part V considers 
this resolution further. On the legal treatment of surrogacy arrangements, see, e.g., MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (1999) (“A surrogate parentage contract is void and unenforceable as 
contrary to public policy.”). Such contracts are contrary to public policy because they fail to 
base custody on the best interests of the child. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
But some states explicitly forbid even the making of surrogacy arrangements that include com-
pensation. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.230 (West 2000) (stating that “[n]o per-
son, organization, or agency shall enter into, induce, arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in 
the formation of a surrogate parentage contract, written or unwritten, for compensation”). 
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go through selective oocyte donation, and such slippery slope argu-
ments thus have little merit here. 
2. Donor selection relies on faulty genetic assumptions regarding the 
propagation of complex characteristics 
As discussed in Part II, the selection of oocyte donors based on 
complex phenotypic characteristics such as height and intelligence 
for the purpose of having tall, smart children is somewhat misguided. 
It fails to consider genetic realities such as multifactorial inheritance 
and the role of the environment in the shaping of individual charac-
ter traits. Because many infertile couples do not appreciate these con-
straints, one could argue that it is inappropriate to let desperate cou-
ples be swept away by the allure of unlikely outcomes. In essence, it 
is substantively unconscionable to let individuals pay so much money 
for so little guarantee. 
But while society’s simplistic misconception of genetic inheri-
tance is indeed problematic, it is not a reason to forbid the com-
modification of oocytes. As long as these couples realize that they are 
paying only for a genetic chance, and not a genetic guarantee, there 
is no reason why they should not have the right to decide for them-
selves whether it is reasonable to enter into such probabilistic trans-
actions. The solution is not to take away the choice but instead to 
make a concerted effort to educate the participants about the under-
lying genetic realities. Although one should never overestimate the 
benefits of informed consent, it seems reasonable enough to assume 
that fertility clinics and physicians are capable of adequately clarifying 
these issues so as to provide participants with meaningful and realistic 
choices. Further, the addition of appropriate legislation, requiring 
sufficient genetic counseling to prospective oocyte recipients, can 
safeguard against poorly informed decision-making. 
3. Treating oocytes like commodities may cause psychological damage in 
the resultant offspring 
Some have argued that a market in oocytes could have adverse 
psychological effects on the resultant offspring.126 The split between 
biological and social rearing could confuse conceptions of family and 
 
 126. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 21, at 120–22. 
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lineage to the detriment of the offspring.127 Knowing that their ge-
netic make-up was bought and sold may cause children to doubt 
their own self-worth and question their parents’ love and motiva-
tions. In addition, knowing that parents paid handsomely for a gam-
ete could create pressures and unrealistic expectations for the child, 
while knowing that they paid only a small sum may erode self-
esteem. 
These arguments should sound familiar to those who have fol-
lowed the assisted reproduction debate for the past few decades. 
They are the same arguments that opponents have advanced against 
surrogacy and sperm donation.128 The issue is identical: Do contrac-
tual arrangements in the reproductive context have adverse psycho-
social effects on the resultant offspring? Because no studies have ex-
amined this hypothesis in the oocyte donation setting, we must look 
elsewhere for empirical evidence. Looking to our experience with the 
products of sperm donation should provide beneficial insight, allow-
ing us to test the hypothesis. 
The studies have not found the children of sperm donation to 
have unusually high risks of psychological damage, decreased self-
esteem, or increased maladjustment.129 In fact, they have fewer social 
and psychological problems than adopted children.130 There is much 
reason to anticipate similar outcomes for the children of oocyte do-
nation, suggesting less psychosocial detriment in oocyte donation 
than even adoption. Further, oocyte donation should have less of a 
psychosocial impact than surrogacy. With surrogacy arrangements, 
money is exchanged for a newborn—a tangible, identifiable child. It 
is the closest that we come to “baby-selling” in our society. But with 
oocyte donation, couples pay only for one of the gametes that might 
eventually lead to the creation of a child. The money is somewhat 
removed from the actual child, dampening the association, at least 
partially. Therefore, it would be logical to expect that oocyte dona-
tion would be less likely than surrogacy to promote feelings of self-
commodification among children. 
Beyond surrogacy, it is tough to argue that any form of assisted 
reproduction has the potential to create more psychological danger 
 
 127. See id. at 121. 
 128. See id. at 120–22. 
 129. See generally R. SNOWDEN ET AL., ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION: A SOCIAL 
INVESTIGATION (1983). 
 130. See id. 
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than adoption. Adoption suffers from the same monetary association 
as assisted reproductive technologies, but it goes further. To even be 
adopted, one must first be given up. Although rarely is it the case 
that the biological parents did not love their child, the dynamics of 
adoption foster the possibility that such children will feel rejected or 
abandoned and possibly blame themselves. Further, while oocyte 
donation lacks this potential for psychological damage, it shares the 
positive element of adoption—children know that their rearing par-
ents very much wanted to have them in their lives and were willing 
to spend time and money to make that dream come true. Maybe this 
actually serves to strengthen self-esteem and familial bonding. Ar-
guably, children who are the products of “natural” coital procrea-
tion, but are unwanted or accidents, are more at risk of psychological 
problems than those children who result from some form of ART. In 
the end, the lack of any support for the hypothesis that oocyte dona-
tion will psychologically damage the resultant offspring severely lim-
its its bite. 
B. Arguments for Free Alienability 
1. Without a market in oocytes, supply will fail to meet demand, 
leaving many infertile couples without the possibility of procreating 
Perhaps the strongest justification for unregulated oocyte-donor 
compensation comes from the comparative analysis of supply and 
demand trends in countries that do and do not limit compensation. 
As mentioned previously, Israel and England severely limit donor 
compensation or ban it altogether. Having eliminated these incen-
tives to donate, both countries are mired in drastic oocyte short-




 131. See, e.g., Sarah Chalmers & Becky Morris, Scandal of the Egg Donations, DAILY MAIL 
(London), Sept. 21, 1999, at 37 (acknowledging that in England “the fundamental problem 
IVF faces . . . is a shortage of egg donors”); Judy Siegel, Groups Voice Support for Liberalizing 
Ova Donations, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 2, 2000, at 4 (quoting Professor Neri Laufer, a fertility 
specialist and head of OBGYN at Hadassah-University Hospital in Jerusalem as saying, “The 
current situation, in which over 2,000 women desperate for a baby are waiting for donated 
ova, brings shame on Israeli medical practice”); Nicole Veash, Internet Donors Offer Perfect 
Babies to Order, THE OBSERVER (London), Aug. 15, 1999, at 3 (noting the imbalance be-
tween supply and demand of oocytes in Britain). 
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couples must wait up to five years just to gain access to any donor at 
all, let alone a donor of their choice.132 
Granted, it is not entirely clear whether this relationship between 
capped compensation and supply shortage is truly causal or instead 
merely correlational. It is quite possible that unidentified confound-
ing variables are responsible for the differential supply dynamics in 
the United States, Israel, and England. For example, it is conceivable 
that local social norms, religious beliefs, or health care delivery sys-
tems contribute to the supply differentials. Without controlled stud-
ies, in which a single country holds all other possible variables con-
stant while switching from capped to uncapped donor compensation, 
it is impossible to know for sure. Undeniably, this is an area ripe for 
further research. Nevertheless, for now, based on available circum-
stantial evidence that emerges from comparisons both between and 
within countries, the best we can do is speculate.133 
If we are committed to procreative liberty and the use of assisted 
reproductive technologies to combat infertility, it follows that we 
should structure the system, in the context of appropriate ethical 
guidelines and quality care standards, so as to maximize the incen-
tives to donate. Doing so will best allow couples to achieve their re-
productive goals, which is the fundamental basis of assisted repro-
duction in the first place. This is not to say that there should be no 
limits. That is not the thesis of this article. If there are rational rea-
sons to draw lines, then we should draw lines. But in the absence of 
compelling justifications otherwise, it is misguided to limit the effec-
tiveness of these technological advances by dampening the incentives 
to donate. The empirical evidence is clear: supply does not meet de-
 
 132. See, e.g., Susan Mansfield, The Gift of Life, ABERDEEN PRESS & J. (Aberdeen, Scot-
land), Oct. 5, 1999, at 13 (noting long waiting lists for oocytes due to the “desperate shortage 
of donors”); Kathleen Morgan, Babies For Sale, DAILY RECORD (Glasgow), Aug. 17, 1999, at 
8 (discussing the two-year waiting list for donor oocytes at the Assisted Reproductive Unit in 
Aberdeen). 
 133. As noted, comparisons between the United States, with its unregulated compensa-
tion, and England and Israel, with their regulated compensation, yield powerful evidence of 
the supply side effects of donor compensation schemes. It is also clear that within the United 
States compensation scheme affects supply. Recall the couple discussed in the Introduction. 
Before the famous $50,000 advertisement, they attempted to entice potential donors with a 
much smaller, typical, amount of money. They received only a few responses, and none of the 
respondents fit the couple’s donor profile. See Sheila Weller, Is This Egg Worth $50,000?, SELF, 
Dec. 2000, at 164. When they increased the compensation to $50,000, hundreds of replies 
flooded in. Clearly, compensation has a direct effect on supply, but the magnitude of that ef-
fect remains unclear. 
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mand when donor compensation is regulated. Without other justifi-
cations, regulation of donor compensation may be one step forward, 
but it is at least two steps back. 
2. As long as there is no identifiable threat to individual or public 
health, the primacy of procreative liberty should prevail 
What makes oocytes, and all reproductive tissues for that matter, 
unique is that they have implications, not only for those parties di-
rectly involved in the transaction, but also for future individuals. Se-
lective reproduction alters the genetic make-up of future generations 
and therefore can impact global public health. For example, genetic 
selection could conceivably lead to normalization of genetic profiles, 
resulting in stagnation of the gene pool. This, in turn, could decrease 
our adaptability and survivability as a species. From a utilitarian per-
spective, this could affect the calculus. The cost to future lives could 
potentially outweigh the benefits to present parties but only if there 
is a cognizable, tangible harm that should and could be prevented. 
In fact, there is no such harm here. First, the numbers are insig-
nificant. In 1997, a little over 2000 live births resulted from oocyte 
donation, including both fresh and frozen donor oocytes.134 Com-
pared to the total number of live births in the United States that 
year, which was 3,880,894,135 this is a trivial statistic. This is not 
wide-scale genetic selection and is not likely to significantly affect the 
diversity of human genetic make-up. 
Second, there are no data to suggest that recipient couples tend 
to choose the same phenotypic and genotypic profiles in donors. It 
may be that couples undergoing oocyte donation vary in selection 
criteria just as much as they vary in their own genetic profiles. Per-
haps these couples choose donors based on similarity to the infertile 
woman, not based on objective standards of social desirability. With-
out adequate studies, we do not know, and we should not presume 
the worst if doing so interferes with procreative liberty. 
Lastly, as mentioned earlier, oocyte donation is neither effective 
nor efficient at achieving targeted genetic selection. Choosing a par-
ticular woman to serve as the source of one-half of the gametic mate-
rial in no way guarantees the propagation of complex characteristics. 
 
 134. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION ET AL., supra note 28, at 41. 
 135. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS 47 (1999). 
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Vastly superior technology already exists in that regard through gene 
replacement and gene therapy. Oocyte donation will therefore never 
be the vehicle for selective enhancement. It is too uncertain to be 
worthwhile. 
For all of these reasons, oocyte donation cannot be the lynchpin 
of genetic drift. It will not result in significant shifts in our collective 
phenotype. And on an individual basis, it is more likely to result in 
benefit than harm. When individuals carrying undesirable inheritable 
disease turn to gamete donation, offspring are spared. In fact, the 
disease frequency is reduced for future generations as well. Because 
there is no identifiable threat or harm to individual or public health, 
there is insignificant justification for trumping individual autonomy 
and procreative liberty in the name of paternalism. 
3. Restricting a woman’s reproductive choices infantalizes adult 
women 
Coherent feminist arguments exist that speak against market-
driven reproduction. Such arguments posit that commodification of 
surrogacy and oocyte donation is the commodification of women 
generally and is yet another example of the subjugation and exploita-
tion of women for the purposes of men.136 Margaret Jane Radin 
summarizes this view, saying that “[t]he feminist argument against 
the market is roughly that in this nonideal world of ours, treating 
women like anonymous fungible breeders objectifies them and recre-
ates subordination.”137 
But equally compelling feminist arguments speak in favor of 
market-based assisted reproduction. These arguments tend to view 
the market as a source of power and liberation for women. From this 
perspective, exclusion from the market for paternalistic concerns 
amounts to infantilization of women and serves to maintain the gen-
der-based power inequities that have become our status quo.138 
 
 136. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 21, at 228–31 (discussing why the “feminist cri-
tique . . . calls into question all reproductive technologies that redound to the benefit of a 
male-dominated society at the expense of women”). See also Maura Ryan, The Argument for 
Unlimited Procreative Liberty: A Feminist Critique, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1990, 
at 6. 
 137. RADIN, supra note 87, at 149. 
 138. See, e.g., ROBERTSON, supra note 21, at 229–31. Professor Robertson states that 
the view that a rights-based view of reproductive technology places power increas-
ingly in the hands of men to the detriment of women overlooks the many ways in 
2BAU-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  8:29 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
162 
Again, Professor Radin summarizes these arguments: 
The feminist argument in favor of . . . the full-blown market, is 
roughly that in this nonideal world of ours, power in the market is 
power, and power is liberating. Women, like men, the argument 
runs, should now be free to get out of their protected sphere and 
enter the market on an equal basis. Men in power should not tell 
them what to sell and what not to sell. Whatever is problematic . . . 
should be for women to deal with as a matter of their own moral 
deliberation and choice.139 
Women should be free to make the same decisions, and possibly 
the same mistakes, as men. That society is so concerned with the 
commodification of surrogacy and oocyte donation, while simulta-
neously lacking similar concern for the commodification of sperm 
donation, devalues women as autonomous equals. Therefore, it is for 
the benefit of all women that some have the opportunity to voluntar-
ily enter this market. 
While it is not clear which way these arguments cut, it is clear 
that feminist objections to commodification that fail to address these 
pro-commodification positions also fail to provide sufficient justifica-
tion for a ban on market-based compensation. 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Surveying and analyzing the ethical, policy, and legal arguments 
for and against a market-based system of compensation for oocyte 
donors leads to the following conclusion: although thoughtful rea-
sons to regulate oocyte donor compensation exist, they are out-
weighed by the arguments for free alienability. The rationales for the 
prohibition of the commodification of organs are either internally ir-
rational or are not applicable to oocyte donation due to its unique 
technical and social aspects. Additionally, oocyte-specific arguments 
 
which technology offers options that expand the freedom of women. It also over-
looks how a rights-based approach, despite its contextual limitations, assures women 
a large measure of control over their reproductive lives. 
Id. at 229. See also Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Breaking With Tradition: Surrogacy and Gay Fa-
thers, in KINDRED MATTERS: RETHINKING THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FAMILY 102, 127 
(Diana Tietjens Meyers et al. eds., 1993) (“Outlawing surrogacy, as a practical matter, would 
do little if anything to promote the demise of patriarchy. Allowing a woman to become a sur-
rogate contract mother arguably could do more to promote women than would a ban. . . . 
[A]llowing fee-paid surrogacy enhances a woman’s economic power.”). 
 139. RADIN, supra note 87, at 149 (citations omitted). 
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misconstrue the potential applications of such technology and fail to 
conform with broader social treatments of noncoital reproduction 
and freedom to contract. Because such arguments are unable to 
identify reasons why society should treat oocyte donation differently, 
they fall short of justifying paternalistic regulation that severely in-
fringes upon autonomy and procreative liberty. 
If assisted reproduction is to make a meaningful difference in the 
lives of the infertile, the system must create appropriate incentives for 
donor participation. Market-driven compensation is not the only 
available avenue, but it appears to have effect. Supply shortages in 
countries that limit or ban donor compensation make it clear that 
such regulation is counterproductive and ill advised. And again, this 
is not to imply that there should be no regulation or oversight at all. 
The end result of the current patchwork legislation is a highly 
autonomous field of egg donation that basically operates on the 
principle of caveat emptor. Despite the highly technical nature of this 
industry, in addition to the emotional urgency of its consumers, 
there is no systematic consumer protection. The system should still 
seek to promote participant safety and procedural efficacy. This 
means standardized procedures, quality control mechanisms, and 
wide-scale dissemination of relevant information like risks, benefits 
and genetic realities. That kind of knowledge is crucial to making an 
informed decision. We should allow women to donate oocytes, de-
spite the attendant medical risks, so long as adequate efforts are 
made to clarify the variables in the risk-benefit equation. We should 
permit couples to pay large sums of money for this technology, so 
long as they are informed of the possible outcomes, particularly the 
established success rates of the clinic at issue. But allowing these de-
cisions to be made in the absence of adequate information does a 
disservice to all involved. 
Still remaining, however, is the question of how to treat oocyte 
donation arrangements. Even if compensation is market-based, that 
does not resolve the issue of the legal status of the “contracts” be-
tween donors, recipients, and fertility clinics. The thesis of this article 
necessarily contemplates that society will not prohibit individuals 
from entering into these arrangements, but that is not the end of the 
inquiry. Options still remain, and choices must be made. 
Assuming that society condones making these contracts, the 
most obvious approach is to treat them as legally binding and hence 
judicially enforceable. If one party breaches contractual obligations, 
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the other could then sue for damages.140 Breaches of contract could 
arise when, for example, the recipient pays the donor up front but 
the donor never undergoes the retrieval process or when the donor 
provides oocytes but the recipient fails to pay either the donor or the 
broker. The other option, alluded to earlier, is to treat such contracts 
as unenforceable, void as against public policy, similar to our general 
treatment of surrogacy arrangements. Individuals would still be free 
to enter into these arrangements, but they could not turn to the le-
gal system for enforcement. Despite one particular attraction of the 
latter approach, the former is preferable. 
The major strength of the unenforceability approach is the ex-
pressive implication of treating these contracts as void as against pub-
lic policy. Expressive concerns appear to lie at the heart of many of 
the anti-commodification arguments considered in this article. Pro-
fessor Radin’s argument that commodification of the human body 
would belittle the human existence assumes that society would treat 
commodified body parts the same as any other commodity. Doing so 
would blur the line between personhood and property to the detri-
ment of human flourishing. Likewise, the concern that commodifica-
tion of oocytes will send us down the slippery slope to full-blown 
eugenics assumes that such commodification will send the message 
that selective enhancement is socially sanctioned. 
But holding such contracts unenforceable and void as against 
public policy mitigates these expressive concerns. Although individu-
als could avail themselves of assisted reproductive technologies in the 
pursuit of procreative liberty, there would be no explicit imprimatur 
of social acceptance. Oocytes, although exposed to the market, 
 
 140. Damages would likely be the only remedy available, as the nature of these arrange-
ments does not make them amenable to enforcement by specific performance. Not only are 
these personal services contracts, which courts are generally loathe to enforce by specific per-
formance, but they involve physically invasive procedures. How would a court carry out spe-
cific performance with a noncompliant donor? Would we physically restrain the individual, 
force her to undergo ovarian hyperstimulation, and then forcibly remove her oocytes? This is 
undesirable and unacceptable. Presumably, however, damages are not what these couples 
would be seeking. They would want the child, not compensation. Further, the prolonged liti-
gation process may undermine the couples’ objectives. For a discussion of the general legal 
trend of avoiding specific performance of personal service contracts, see, e.g., FRIEDRICH 
KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1069–108 (3d ed. 1986) (chronicling 
the history of judicial treatment of specific performance and stating, “It is true, or at any rate a 
truism, that in Anglo-American law, from at least the seventeenth century, specific performance 
has been regarded as an exceptional remedy in equity, available only when a judgment at law 
for money damages is, on some theory, ‘inadequate.’”). 
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would continue to be treated, and thus viewed, as distinct from all 
other commodities. Therefore, expressive concerns and line blurring 
would be minimized. 
Despite this conciliatory quality of the unenforceability approach, 
it is inconsistent with the weight of logic and the thesis of this article. 
As argued throughout, the benefits of the commodification of oo-
cyte donation—namely increased supply and the resulting enhance-
ment of procreative liberty—outweigh any associated costs. Lacking 
sufficient justification for disparate treatment, oocytes should be 
treated like commodities, and that includes providing for the legal 
enforcement of donation contracts. 
Indeed, doing so will likely add to the incentives to donate, 
thereby increasing supply even further. Judicial recognition of the 
commercial value of oocytes will provide ex ante protections to both 
potential donors and recipients, alleviating concerns of breached 
contracts and uncompensated sacrifices. In fact, maybe courts should 
inspect these contracts even more closely than those of other com-
modities. Maybe there should be less reliance on default rules and 
greater scrutiny of the terms; perhaps that would be the best way to 
protect the interests of the parties. But without the promise of en-
forceability, many potential donors would likely be dissuaded from 
donating, fearful that recipients might change their mind once the 
retrieval process had already commenced. And recipients, desperate 
to procreate, would be at the mercy of legally unrestrained donors. 
Although the unenforceability approach might ease the minds of 
some, it would undermine the very purpose of commodification itself 
by providing disincentives to enter into such arrangements, and it 
would leave all parties vulnerable to misrepresentation and deceit. 
Further, it appears that the expressive argument cuts both ways. 
It may very well be true that socially sanctioned oocyte commodifica-
tion sends undesirable messages about our conception of the sanctity 
of human life. But social prohibition of oocyte commodification has 
expressive dangers as well. It sends undesirable messages about the 
social and self worth of those who want to donate oocytes and those 
who cannot procreate otherwise. It degrades their desire to partici-
pate in the reproductive context. Therefore, it is not an entirely sta-
ble ground on which to mount an objection to commodification. 
Certainly, treating these arrangements as legally enforceable con-
tracts leads to further questions and forces further decisions. Should 
the courts recognize express, or even implied, warranties in the con-
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tracts? If so, what should be the permissible parameters of such 
clauses? For example, if the resultant offspring does not turn out to 
be 5’5’’ or athletic, or fails to break 1400 on the SAT, should the re-
cipient have the right to sue the donor for breach of warranty? How 
should parties structure the compensation clauses, and how should 
parties and courts determine appropriate damages? And how should 
the best interests of the child affect the analysis? We must make these 
and many more difficult choices if we are to recognize the legality of 
oocyte donation contracts. But this is no reason to pass on the op-
portunity before us. Rest assured, the debates will ensue, and the de-
cisions will be made. 
Regardless of how we ultimately resolve the oocyte donation di-
lemma, the discussion serves to inform and instruct society in all of 
its technological deliberations. Consistent with countless prior tech-
nological advances, compensated oocyte donation has been met with 
reflexive opposition and emotion-based disapproval. Although in-
formative, such appeals must give way to reason and rationality. We 
have seen it before, and we will see it again, because technology will 
continue to progress. If we are to make the most of it, novelty must 
not become synonymous with depravity. 
 
